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This Article is the first to use a property lens to explore the social construction of honor
within legal systems around the world. The Article makes the claim that the law in many
countries has implicitly treated honor as a form ofproperty and has made legal and social
allowances for men who seek to reclaim honor property through violence. The Article
expands the boundaries of the existing scholarship concerning honor-related violence by
exploring the intersections between social constructions of honor and social constructions
of property. Using a property lens to analyze the relationship between honor patriarchal
control, and lawprovides a deeper understanding ofthe motivations for this form ofgender-
based violence. The Article also assesses the implications of this new theoretical model and
concludes that honor must be refrained to position women as potential holders of honor
property and to disassociate honor from the social regulation of women s sexuality.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the world, honor operates as a form of social currency.' It is a highly
valued and zealously protected asset.' Although not alienable, honor functions informally
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I PIERRE BOURDIEU, MASCULINE DOMINATION 45 (2001) ("When ... the acquisition of symbolic capital and social
capital is more or less the only possible form of accumulation, women are assets which must be protected from
offence and suspicion and which, when invested in exchanges, can produce alliances, in other words social capital,
and prestigious allies, in other words symbolic capital. To the extent that the value of these alliances, and therefore
the symbolic profit they can yield, partly depends on the symbolic value of the women available for exchange, that is
to say, on their reputation and especially their chastity-constituted as a fetishised measure of masculine reputation,
and therefore of the symbolic capital of the whole lineage-the honour of the brothers or fathers, which induces a
vigilance as attentive, and even paranoid, as that of the husbands, is a form of enlightened self-interest.").
2 See Suzanne Ruggi, Conmntodifying Honor in Female Sexuality: Honor Killings in Palestine, 206 MIDDLE E. REP.
12, 12, 13 (1998) ("[A] woman's 'ard (honor) is a commodity which must be guarded by a network of family and
community members.").
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as a form of property.3 Honor exists in some form within most communities and often
operates to constrain women's behavior. 4 Although a common misperception links honor
primarily with cultures in the Middle East, honor functions in similarly gendered ways
around the world.'
This Article makes the claim that the law in many countries has implicitly treated
honor as a form of property and has made legal and social allowances for men who seek
to reclaim honor property through violence. Within communities in which honor is highly
valued, honor property is held collectively by a family and controlled largely by male
members of the family.6 The value of honor property depends primarily on the degree to
which female members of the family conform their behavior, sexual and otherwise, to
social expectations.7 Although women are not typically seen as holders of honor property,
women play a significant role in determining its value to the family as a whole.' Notably,
3 In her influential article, Market-Inalienability, Margaret Jane Radin "develop[ed] a theory of market-inalienability,
[through which she argues] that inalienabilities should not always be conceived of as anomalies, regardless of whether
they attach to things traditionally thought of as property." Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849, 1851 (1987).
4 Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain, "Honour " Rights and Wrongs, in "HoNoUR" CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1, 7 (Lynn Welchman & Sara Hossain eds., 2005) ("In many societies, the ideal of masculinity is
underpinned by a notion of 'honour'-of an individual man, or a family or a community-and is fundamentally
connected to policing female behaviour and sexuality. Honour is generally seen as residing in the bodies of women.
Frameworks of 'honour,' and its corollary 'shame,' operate to control, direct, and regulate women's sexuality and
freedom of movement by male members of the family.").
5 See Joseph A. Vandello & Dov Cohen, Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts that Perpetuate
Domestic Violence, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 997, 997 (2003) ("Cultures around the world vary in the
importance attached to the construct of honor. In one sense, the definition of honor is consistent across cultures.
Almost all cultures place value on honor defined as virtuous behavior....").
6 YusuF MANSUR, MUSA M. SHTEIW & NERMEEN MURAD, THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF HONOR CRIMES IN JORDAN
16 (2009), http://mathlouma.com/sites/default/files/studyen O.pdf ("In the event that a woman is perceived to have
acted against the traditional ethical code, it is the patrilineal family, not the woman, on whom 'honor' is lost.").
7 Sharon K. Araji, Crimes of Honor and Shame: Violence Against Women in Non- Western and Western Societies,
8 RED FEATHER J. POSTMODERN CRIMINOLOGY (2000), http://critcrim.org/redfeather/journal-pomocrim/vol-8-shaming/
araji.html ("Women in traditional societies do not have a claim to honor as individuals, separate from their roles within
a family, clan or tribal unit. Their actions as individuals, particularly through actual or perceived sexual misconduct,
can only bring dishonor to others. However, it is not only sexual misconduct, but any misbehavior on the part of the
female members that can bring shame and dishonor to the male members or a whole community, lineage or family.").
8 Hannah Irfan, Honour Related Violence Against Women in Pakistan, prepared for World Justice Forum, Vienna,
July 2-5, 2008, at I ("Honour of the male members of the family is understood to reside in the bodies of the women
of the family."); Rachel A. Ruane, Comment, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and
Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2000) ("According to tribal custom, a woman is the repository for her
family's honor.").
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the claim here is not that women are, themselves, a form of property. Women are agents
who make decisions about their own sexuality, and those decisions either inflate, preserve,
or decrease the value of familial honor property.
Because the value of honor property fluctuates based on women's behavior, other
family members, often males, seek to aggressively monitor and control the behavior of the
women in the family.9 In its most extreme form, control over women's behavior manifests
in honor-related violence, including murder.'0 In some countries, the law perpetuates this
implicit understanding of honor as property by reducing penalties for those who commit
crimes in an effort to reclaim honor.
I realize that it is problematic to discuss "the law" or "legal systems" without exploring
the myriad differences between legal systems and the differences in resources and power
within and among countries. The purpose of this Article, however, is not to explore
deeply the legal system of any particular country. Rather, the Article establishes a general
architecture that reflects the ways in which honor operates as a gendered source of property
in many different countries and in many different legal systems.
Drawing on the rich scholarship that has illuminated examples of honor-based violence,
primarily in the Middle East, I provide here a new, property-based lens through which to
explore honor as a common social regulatory device, one that operates not only in the
"East" but around the world. The Article also draws on examples from the United States
and other countries in the global North. These northern examples of honor as a regulator of
women's sexuality help to establish the global architecture of honor. The examples counter
the Orientalist tendency to recognize honor as a constraint on women only in the global
South.'2 I hope that this Article will provide a new, property-based theoretical lens with
which to explore the notion of honor in a number of different regions and socio-legal
systems.
9 Hannana Siddiqui, "There Is No 'Honour'in Domestic Violence, Only Shame!" Women s Struggles Against
"Honour" Crimes in the UK, in "HONOUR" CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at 263,
264 ("'[Hlonor' ... is essentially a tool to police and control a woman's behavior. Transgression results in her
'punishment,' often in the form of social ostracism, harassment and even acts of violence.").
10 Id.
I I See infra notes 107-54 and accompanying text.
12 RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM 114 (2005) ("1 examine how
victimisation rhetoric has reinforced an imperialist response towards women in the developing world whereby the
third world subject is represented as the real, or most authentic, victim subject.").
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Notions of honor serve as barometers of familial worth. 13 Honor is frequently gendered.
Communities value women, at least in part, for the honor they bring to their families and
punish women for the shame that they bring to their families for alleged transgressions of
social and sexual norms. 4 Although expectations for women's behavior vary somewhat
from country to country, honor is a common theme, requiring women to adhere strictly
to social norms.' 5 The social pressure to conform to norms of chastity and virginity is
strong, and many families police the behavior of unmarried daughters and sisters to ensure
compliance with these social dictates. 6 Failure to conform to social expectations, or
the perception that a woman has failed to conform, may result in coercion or violence
perpetrated by the woman's natal family, ranging from bullying to murder.7 Penal codes
in a number of countries tolerate or justify these acts of violence as a reflection of a deeply
13 See Mazna Hussain, Comment, "Take My Riches, Give Me Justice ": A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan s Honor
Crimes Legislation, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 223, 227 (2006) ("Rather than possessing honor herself, a woman is a
symbolic vessel of male honor, therefore all of her actions are considered to reflect upon her male family members.").
14 John Alan Cohan, Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense, 40 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 177, 187 (2010) ("The honor
of the village group lies with the modesty of its women and the readiness of its men to protect this modesty.").
15 See Diane Baxter, Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture, 80 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
Q. 737, 741 (2007) ("Generally, honor has been represented as a reward which men bestow on other men based, in
large part, on their women following a particular sexual code. Women's comportment, then, provides a fundamental
axis of evaluation."); Noor Akbar Khalil & Mashhood Ahmed Sheikh, Political Manipulation in Human Rights
Violations: A Case of Honor Killings in Balochistan, Pakistan, 2 PAKISTANIAAT: J. PAKISTAN STUD. 36, 38 (2010) ("For
women it is obligatory to follow a peculiar code of conduct in and outside home and refrain from certain behaviors,
as its considered to bring 'Shame' and 'dishonor' to the family, which in most cases results in the death of the...
woman.") (errors in original).
16 See RABIA ALl, THE DARK SIDE OF "HoNOUR" 23 (Farida Shaheed & Nabila Malick eds., 2001) ("Inflicting death
upon the woman is no longer only a prerogative of the husband or the father. Any male in the family-brother, son,
uncle, nephew-considers himself within his rights to end her life if he believes that she has violated the conditions of
her existence."); Mark Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role ofRule of Law for the Women of Afghanistan, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 357 (2004) ("[T]he criminalization of breaches of sharply circumscribed gender roles
and widespread physical attacks on those who breach these roles persists in post-Taliban Afghanistan."); Fadia Faqir,
lntrafamily Femicide in Defense of Honor: The Case of Jordan, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 65, 70 (2001) ("Significantly
women also police each other through the spreading of rumours.").
17 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS: JUSTICE DENIED FOR "HONOR" CRIMES IN JORDAN 1 (2004)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS) ("In Jordan, a woman's life is at risk if she engages
in 'immoral or shameful' acts .... Male relatives may beat, shoot, stab, or otherwise physically harm an accused
woman, with the approval of both her family members and large sections of the general population."); Stephanie
Palo, A Charade of Change: Qisas and Diyat Ordiance Allows Honor Killings to Go Unpunished in Pakistan, 15
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93, 98 (2008), quoted in Cohan, supra note 14, at 187 ("[W]hen honor is supposedly
betrayed or lost, disciplining, or even killing, the woman at fault may restore honor that has been damaged by a
woman's immoral or unchaste actions.").
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entrenched commitment to honor.'8
In Jordan, for example, one family spent six years looking for their daughter, Basma,
who had run away with another man and had been divorced by her husband.'9 Within
the Jordanian town of Rusayfeh, community members who felt that the family needed to
cleanse its honor openly castigated her family.20 The family's eight other daughters were
considered unmarriageable. 2' Basma's sixteen-year-old brother, who was only ten years old
when she left, murdered his sister after boys in the community insulted him, questioning
his masculinity.22 After the murder, one of Basma's sisters remarked, "Now we can walk
with our heads held high.
23
In the United States, since 1993, over 2.5 million adolescents have taken a "virginity
pledge" in response to a social movement sponsored by the Southern Baptist Church. 24
Through the pledge, American adolescents promise to remain virgins until they marry.
Researchers have found that the pledge is most effective when it is an important marker
of identity.25 In other words, when teens are able to define themselves against a perceived
immoral or dishonorable other, pledges can be effective. 26 Pledges sometimes function
as regulatory devices in much the same way that coercive messages of honor function to
18 See Catherine Warrick, The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan, 39 LAW & Soc'v
REV. 315, 326 (2005) ("The Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese penal codes provide reductions or
elimination of penalty for murders committed for reasons of honor. The statutes generally specify that the
victim is female, that the perpetrator is a male relative of a certain degree (usually brother, father, or husband),
and the circumstances of the victim's behavior that justify the crime (catching a wife in the act of adultery, for
example).").
19 Faqir, supra note 16, at 72.
20 Id.





24 Peter S. Bearman & Hannah Brickner, Promising the Future: Virginity Pledges and First Intercourse,
106 AM. J. Soc. 859, 859-60 (2001).
25 Id. at 870.
26 Id. ("The pledge movement, in this sense, is an identity movement-that is, a movement that provides
a frame for self-understanding (and consequently action in pursuit of that understanding) effective only in the
context of, and interaction with, similar others who constitute a self-conscious community differentiated from
others.").
206 23.2
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constrain women's sexuality.
Violent efforts to enforce virginity or honor 7 are a form of gender-based violence
designed to regulate women's sexual behavior and enforce rigid social codes. 28 The degree
to which the community perceives individual women as chaste and virtuous often has
a very real economic impact on their families. The families of women who have been
accused of dishonorable conduct may be ostracized, economically penalized in the market,
or unable to arrange for marriages of other daughters and sisters-all of which has an
economic cost to families.
29
This Article posits that honor itself is a type of property.30 Honor is a form of property
which, although generated and lost largely through women's behavior, is held collectively
by the family and controlled largely by male members of the family.3 When men lose
honor property through the actions of women in their families, I argue that legal systems
make allowances for familial efforts to reclaim honor property through acts of violence
perpetrated against the offending female family member.32 The law facilitates this
understanding of honor as property and maintains incentives for families to reclaim honor
property through violence directed at female family members.33
Part I of this Article explores the meaning of honor, drawing on similarities across legal
systems. Although the specifics of honor-related violence vary to some extent by country,
27 The use of the term "honor crimes" or "honor killings" has been controversial, with some activists
preferring the term "so-called crimes of honor" as a critique of the justification of these crimes. See Irfan, supra
note 8, at 4 ("Rights activists and feminists are opposed to the use of the term 'honour' in conjunction with
criminal acts that target women particularly, especially in the context of 'honour killings,' as this implies an
acceptance of the notion that women embody the honour of males and thus promotes a concept of honour that
endorses or indeed requires violence against women and at the least suppression of their rights, for it to remain
unharmed and intact.").
28 See Siddiqui, supra note 9 ('"[H]onor'... is essentially a tool to police and control a woman's behavior.
Transgression results in her 'punishment,' often in the form of social ostracism, harassment and even acts of
violence.").
29 See MANSUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 33 ("A dishonored female-and consequently-family would be less
able to conduct its usual activities with the usual ease. Other siblings may not be able to marry because they are
'shamed.' The head of household may not be able to find work as a 'dishonored' man.").
30 See discussion infra Part 1t.
31 Id.
32 See discussion infra Part I1I.
33 Id.
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this section seeks to identify some commonalities and provide a general picture of the
manifestation of honor-related violence within a handful of countries. The Article identifies
a pattern in the ways that honor operates as a form of property. As such, the Article seeks
to avoid "Orientalism's binary juxtaposition of a 'traditional' East with a 'modern' West-
the theoretical engine of colonialism-[which] was premised in part on perceptions of
non-Western women as oppressed subjects."34 Without a deep exploration of honor in any
particular country, the Article identifies common pathways through which honor, variable
in form and potency, operates as a form of property. Part I also explores the relationship
between honor and economics, including an exploration of financial incentives for a family
to attempt to reclaim lost honor property at the expense of female family members.
Part II expands the boundaries of the existing scholarship concerning honor-related
violence by exploring the intersections between social constructions of honor and social
constructions of property. In this Article, my claim is that, within many communities, legal
and social constructions treat honor as an intangible property right that is held largely by
men, although it derives its value based on the extent to which women within the family
conform to social expectations. Using a property lens to analyze the relationship between
honor, patriarchal control, and law provides a deeper understanding of the motivations
for this form of gender-based violence.35 Property theory explains, but does not justify,
leniency within many legal systems for perpetrators of honor-related violence. Because
the law implicitly recognizes honor as a form of property that is possessed largely by men,
legal systems make allowances for those men seeking to recover such property, despite the
brutality of acts committed in the name of honor reclamation.
Notions of honor nest within core property principles. Honor operates in many of
the same ways that more traditional forms of property operate to regulate behavior and
incentives. Property principles regulate behavior in a number of ways. The principles
reflect two primary social functions within a community. Property reflects and reinforces
power relations and operates as a communicative device to reduce social conflict.36 Part
II offers a typology of property principles that delineates property concepts according to
the primary functions of power and communication. The section also explores the extent
34 Leti Volpp, Feninism Versus Multiculturalisn, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1195 (2001).
35 This Article attempts to establish a new theoretical lens through which to view notions of honor. In doing
so, it draws heavily on western notions of property to broadly construct a theoretical framework. I recognize
that there will be theoretical points with less resonance in certain geographic areas. This Article is merely meant
to sketch a theoretical jumping-off point for further analysis in subsequent work.
36 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-82 (1985) [hereinafter
Rose, Possession] ("Why, then, is it so important that property owners make and keep their communications
clear? Economists have an answer: clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict.").
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to which property principles help to further our understanding of the ways in which honor
operates to justify a particular form of violence against women.
For example, Lockean labor theory requires one to invest one's labor in the property in
question in order to possess it.37 In the honor context, owners of honor property go to great
lengths, investing considerable labor, in preserving the value of honor property by seeking
to control the social and sexual behavior of women within their families. I offer a critique
of Lockean labor theory in this context, however, as it renders invisible women's own
labor in increasing or preserving the value of honor property. The right to exclude others,
an exertion of power, is another hallmark of property ownership.3 8 In the context of honor,
primarily male family members claim a right to exclude others from sexual access to their
sisters or daughters in an effort to preserve the value of their honor property.
I explore how the relational aspects of property ownership map onto the relational
aspects of honor. Recognizing the relational aspects of property allows one to conceive
of possession as a communication to the world. Here, I draw heavily on Carol Rose's
theory of communication as possession.39 For communication to succeed in articulating
a possessory claim, it has to be "a clear act."4 In the context of honor, family members
communicate possession of honor property by clearly and publicly policing women's
behavior to ensure that it comports with social expectations. These policing behaviors are
the "text" of the possessory communication. Clarity is necessary to reduce the conflict that
stems from ambiguity of ownership. 4' Owners of honor property clearly communicate their
ownership and thus avoid fighting off all would-be suitors, preventing a decrease in the
value of honor property.
Finally, Part III explores the implications of the law's treatment of honor as a form
of property held largely by men. This Article asserts that the law's implicit treatment of
honor as a form of male property explains why many penal codes offer reduced penalties
37 JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19 (Charles L.
Sherman ed., 1937) (1689) ("Whatsoever [one] removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.")
(emphasis in original).
38 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 593 (2007) ("The right to exclude has long been considered a
central component of property.").
39 See infra note 246 and accompanying text (exploring Rose's theory).
40 See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 36.
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for honor-related violence. The Article identifies the problems associated with treating
honor as a form of male property and argues that reform is best accomplished through
both criminal law reform and community redefinition of social norms. Part III argues that
reform is necessary to ensure both that women become potential holders of honor property
and that communities redefine honor in ways that reject honor-related violence. The precise
parameters of an effective law reform agenda are outside the scope of this Article but
remain ripe for further scholarly exploration.
Because eliminating the notion of honor is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable,
advocates for reform must work with local communities to redefine honor. Communities
must embrace alternative ways of measuring honor that do not rely on the degree to which
women conform to social expectations. Practically speaking, efforts to eradicate honor-
related violence must include targeted criminal law reform and community dialogue that
uses a human rights framework to shift the discourse around honor to include women as
potential honor property holders and as full citizens with rights to bodily integrity, sexual
autonomy, and economic empowerment.
In other words, honor may continue to be a valued form of property, but that value
should not be contingent upon women's strict adherence to norms of chastity and patriarchal
deference. Through extensive community discourse facilitated by local human rights
activists, communities may incrementally redefine honor as a form of reputational property
that is accumulated and valued without reference to women's sexuality. Women should
ultimately be able to accumulate this redefined honor property and enjoy the attendant
social benefits.
I. Honor Defined
A. Honor as Virtue and Reputation
Honor is a variable, context-dependent concept.42 Although the precise meaning of
honor fluctuates among communities, 43 the term often refers to either virtue or reputation.'
Honor often has two related meanings: one internal, meaning the extent to which one
considers oneself virtuous and worthy of respect, and one external, meaning the extent to
42 FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 33 (1994).
43 See id. at 30-53 (discussing extensively the various meanings of the word "honor" and tracing the history
of its use).
44 Vandello, supra note 5, at 998 ("In addition to the widely shared definition of honor as virtue, a second
meaning of honor has to do with honor as status, precedence, and reputation .... ").
23.2210
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which the community values one's moral worth. 45 With respect to virtue, a person may gain
honor by acting in accordance with the community's definition of virtuous behavior.46 With
respect to status and reputation, a person's ability to gain honor depends on that person's
power to secure deferential treatment within the community.47 Some theorists categorize
honor as horizontal (right to respect as an equal) or vertical (right to special respect as a
superior).48 Anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers suggests, "[h]onor is the value of a person in
his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized
by society, his right to pride.
49
In many contemporary communities in which honor plays an important role in defining
identity, a family's status depends upon its reputation for honorable conduct, as measured
by the extent to which women in the family engage in chaste, virginal behavior.50 In the
United States, this link between virginity and reputation has fueled the movement within
the Southern Baptist Church to promote chastity pledges.5 In Turkey, there are different
types of honor. One type of honor, seref refers to "the glory derived from a man's own or
one's male kin's accomplishments . . . -"I A second type of honor, namus, is specifically
correlated with sexual chastity among one's female relatives.53 In many communities,
45 STEWART, supra note 42, at 13.
46 See Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN
SOCIETY 22-23 (J. Peristiany ed., 1966) (distinguishing honor as a sentiment and mode of conduct from honor
as "a qualification for the Honours List").
47 See RICHARD NISBETT & Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 4
(1996) ("Honor in this sense is not based on good character but on a man's strength and power to enforce his
will on others.").
48 STEWART, supra note 42, at 48 ("Any right to respect as an equal is an instance of horizontal
honor .... Vertical honor is the right to special respect enjoyed by those who are superior.") (emphasis in
original).
49 Pitt-Rivers, supra note 46, at 22.
50 See Ruggi, supra note 2.
51 Bearman & Briickner, supra note 24, at 859-60.
52 Aysan Sev'er & Gokceciecek Yurdakul, Culture of Honor Culture of Change: A Feminist Analysis of
Honor Killings in Rural Turkey, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 964, 972 (2001).
53 Clementine van Eck, Honor Killings in the Netherlands, in CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE HUMAN
CHALLENGE 236 (William A. Haviland, Harald E. L. Prins, Dana Walrath & Bunny McBride eds., 12th ed. 2007)
("For women and girls namus means chastity, while for men it means having chaste family members. A man is
therefore dependent for his namus on the conduct of the womenfolk in his family.").
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women are seen as "the repositories of family honor. 54
In Italy, informal social codes encourage men to develop a reputation for brave or
honorable conduct or to protect a reputation inherited at birth.55 Women, in contrast, must
defend their family's honor through passive adherence to social rules requiring chastity. 6
Writing about India, Annie George observes:
Honor is thought to reside primarily, but not exclusively, in the bodies of
women and is maintained through female chastity, virtue, and subdued
body language, dress, and demeanor. Individual honor is usually subsumed
to family and religious or caste community honor, which, typically, is
maintained through restrictions on women's movements, opportunities,
and life choices. 7
Honor functions in similar, although by no means identical, ways in cultures associated
with both the East and the West. 8 Although Orientalist constructions of honor suggest that
it derives from eastern cultures, this elides the ways honor operates in the West.59 Notions
of honor and shame are intertwined with campaigns promoting virginity and chastity in the
United States. Conceptions of honor are also embedded in the American criminal justice
system's "heat of passion" defense, which is often invoked in cases involving a cuckolded
man who kills his wife or her paramour after discovering her infidelity.60 As Lama Abu-
Odeh suggests, both honor and passion are used to justify violence against women in legal
systems around the world.
61
54 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM? VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PAKISTAN 43 (1999) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM?].
55 Maria Gabriella Bettiga-Boukerbout, "Crimes of Honour " in the Italian Penal Code: An Analysis of History and
Reform, in "HONOUR" CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at 230, 231.
56 Id. at 230 ("Historically, Italian society has put a lot of pressure on women to conform to certain values.").
57 Annie George, Reinventing Honorable Masculinity: Discourses from a Working-Class Indian Community, 9
MEN & MASCULINITIES 35, 37 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
58 Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West,"
1997 UTAH L. REv. 287, 290 (1997) [hereinafter Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking] (discussing honor, Abu-Odeh
exposes "the fallacy of... the orientalist construction that the East is different from the West").
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. Abu-Odeh also notes important differences in the operation of honor and passion as legal constructs. Most
notably, honor is used more often to justify violence against sisters, daughters, and mothers, while passion is used to
justify violence against girlfriends, wives, former girlfriends, and former wives. Id. at 291.
212 23.2
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
Historically, in the United States, notions of honor and passion have combined with
notions of race and class to define entitlement to honor property. In the early twentieth-
century South, for example, honor was a racialized and gendered code that privileged the
white, southern gentleman. 62 During this period and continuing today, the perceived honor
of the perpetrator or victim of criminal behavior affected the outcome of the case.63 "The
idea that a female victim who was not considered 'respectable' was in some way deserving
of cruelty and death, reflected the South's chivalric code and the continued equation of
female sexual purity/marital fidelity and male honor, and conversely female sexual
misconduct and male dishonor, notions not exclusive to southern society."'
In one example from mid-nineteenth-century America, Congressman Daniel Sickles
killed his wife's lover in broad daylight for "dishonor[ing]" his home; a jury acquitted him
in 1859.65 In another case, from 1901, Charles Armstrong of Jacksonville, Florida killed his
wife after accusing her of infidelity. His acquittal was largely the result of damage to "Mrs.
Armstrong's reputation as a loyal wife. 6 6 "In acquitting Armstrong on the grounds of
temporary insanity, the message of the court was that adultery justified domestic violence if
a white man's honor was at stake. '67 Writing about honor in the nineteenth century, Robert
Ireland observed, "[t]he criminal justice system of nineteenth-century America, in response
to the pressures of the Victorian sexual code, readily forgave males who avenged sexual
dishonor in cases that usually involved husbands, brothers, or fathers who killed the men
who had violated the honor of their wives, sisters, or daughters.
68
Although many of the conclusions to be drawn from this portrayal of honor in Jordan
or the United States, for example, are limited to those particular historical moments and
geographic spaces, these and other examples help to sketch the rough parameters of honor as
a cross-cultural regulatory device. It is possible to extrapolate from these specific contexts
the ways in which honor generally operates as a form of property that privileges men in its
operation. This Article does not offer an exhaustive case study detailing the ways in which
62 Vivien Miller, Wife-Killers and Evil Temptresses: Gender Pardons and Respectability in Florida, 1889-1914,
75 FLA. HIST. Q. 44, 46 (1996).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 60.
65 Sarah Mark, In 1859, Capital Was a Wild, Wild Washington, WASH. POST, July 17, 2000, at A01.
66 Miller, supra note 62, at 56.
67 Id.
68 Robert M. Ireland, Frenzied and Fallen Females: Women and Sexual Dishonor in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 3 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 95, 97 (1992).
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honor operates in a particular country or legal system. Such country studies already exist
for a number of regions and countries. 69 Rather, the Article posits that honor operates as a
form of property in vaguely similar, gendered ways around the world. The Article seeks to
establish a theoretical lens that may be broadly used to explore.manifestations of honor in
specific cultural and geographic scenarios.
B. Honor-Related Violence
As noted above, legal systems may attempt to justify honor-related violence in terms
of honor, passion, or both. The law reflects and reinforces deeply held notions of honor
and reputation within the community. Describing seventeenth-century England, one
commentator notes, "Above all else, men from whatever social status were only held worthy
of honour if they could demonstrate control over their wives, children and servants."70
It is useful to envision a continuum of honor-related violence, with violence that
is explicitly linked to honor at one end. The other end of the continuum, however, also
includes violence that is allegedly provoked by women's failure to conform to gender
stereotypes and transgression of sexual boundaries. In other words, it includes behavior that
may implicitly dishonor and, in so doing, provoke violence. Describing clinical work with
abusive men in the United States, Donna Coker writes, "In addition to verbal aggression,
abusive men claim to be provoked by their perception of the woman's inadequacy as a
home-maker/cook, by her 'failure' to respond sexually or to behave in a deferential manner
(e.g., 'not knowing when to be quiet'), or because they believe her to be-or believe she
69 See, e.g., Pratiksha Baxi, Shirin M. Rai & Shaheen Sardar Ali, Legacies of Common Law: "Crimes of
Honour" in India and Pakistan, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 1239 (2006) (juxtaposing the traditional and modem view
of honor crimes through a comparison of the state response to honor crimes via police action and the view of the
court system in India and Pakistan); Anahid Devartanian Kulwicki, The Practice of Honor Crimes: A Glimpse
of Domestic Violence in the Arab World, 23 IssuEs IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 77 (2002) (using Jordan as a
case study to discuss honor crimes in patrilineal societies in the Arab world); Laura Sue Nelson, The Defense of
Honor: Is It Still Honored in Brazil?, II WIS. INT'L L.J. 531 (1993) (using a landmark case as a reference point
to argue that strides in the women's movement are often illusory or have unintended consequences, rendering
honor crimes a persistent occurrence in Brazilian society); Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, "Honour" Crimes
in Contemporary Greece, 20 BRIT. J. Soc. 205, 206 (1969) (using a survey of honor crimes in 1960s Greece to
discuss how modernization has shifted what constitutes "honor" and how society views and punishes crimes
associated with maintenance of this honor).
70 Elizabeth Foyster, Male Honour, Social Control and Wife Beating in Late Stuart England, 6 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
HIST. Soc'Y 215, 215 (1996); see also Lisa R. Pruitt, "On the Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends ":
Injury from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965 (2003). Pruitt describes cases involving female
plaintiffs who alleged sexual slander in nineteenth-century America. She notes, "These women's sexual behavior was
not only commodified, it was elevated to a status of the utmost importance, with courts often expressly recognizing
their husbands and fathers as its proprietors, the true parties in interest in these matters." Id. at 973.
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desires to be-sexually unfaithful."'" I do not argue that every domestic homicide is an
honor crime or that every invocation of the heat of passion defense implicates honor. Some
cases, however, in which provocation is raised as a defense-both in the East and in the
West-involve violence that was implicitly or explicitly motivated by a loss of honor.
These cases may be included on a continuum of honor-related crimes against women.
Honor is similarly gendered throughout the world. A Jordanian man, who was jailed
for six months after killing his sister after she had been raped, said, "I would rather die
than lose my honour .... Our whole life is founded on honour. If we lose it, we have no
life, we become swine .... We're no better than animals.""2 Lama Abu-Odeh describes
a "paradigmatic example" of an honor killing as "the killing of a woman by her father
or brother for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or
outside of marriage."73
Approximately 5000 honor killings are committed each year around the globe,74
although it is impossible to know the precise number of honor crimes, as their incidence is
often unreported.75 This estimate is based on a narrow definition of honor-related violence
and does not include many acts of violence on the continuum of honor-related violence
described above. According to one estimate, honor crimes "account for 70 percent of
murder cases involving Palestinian women. ' 76 Honor crimes, narrowly defined as those in
which honor is explicitly implicated, occur in many countries, including Brazil, Denmark,
Egypt, Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the
71 Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 97 (1992-93).
72 International Campaign Against Honour Killing, Honour, http://www.stophonourkillings.com/?q=node/3783
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012) (quoting Sirhan, age 35, interviewed in ABC documentary The Lost Honor of Sirhan after
serving a six month sentence in Jordan for killing his sister who had fallen victim to rape, 2003).
73 Lama Abu-Odeh, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Honor Killings and the Construction of
Gender in Arab Societies, 58 AM. J. Comp. L. 911, 911 (2010) [hereinafter Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings]; see also Leyld
Pervizat, In the Name of Honor, HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE (2003) at 31 ("When her name is out as a transgressor, her male
relatives cannot walk in the village with heads high. To reclaim their manhood in the eyes of other men, they cleanse
their honor by stabbing or sometimes stoning her.").
74 United Nations Population Fund, Ending Violence Against Women and Girls, in STATE OF WORLD POPULATION
2000 (2000), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2000/english/ch03.html.
75 See Sohail Akbar Warraich, "Honour Killings" and the Law in Pakistan, in "HONOUR" CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at 80; Warrick, supra note 18, at 325 ("Many observers, including the police,
doubt the accuracy of these numbers and believe that the actual rate of honor killings [in Jordan] is much higher.").
76 Bruce Dunne, Power and Sexuality in the Middle East, 206 MIDDLE E. REP. 8, 11 (1998) (citing Ruggi, supra
note 2).
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Netherlands, Pakistan, Qatar, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen.77 Honor crimes, broadly
defined as a continuum including some cases in which provocation is raised as a defense
and honor is an implicit motivator, occur in most if not all countries. Honor killings are the
most serious form of honor crime, but family members may also subject victims to "long-
term low-level physical abuse and bullying as a punishment for 'bringing dishonor on the
family." 78
Honor killings occur in many different religious communities, including "Muslims,
Christians, Jews, Yezidis, Druze, Sikhs, Hindus, and non-believers."79 Honor crimes
existed before the establishment of all of the major religions, including Islam.80 Although
some honor crimes are committed in Islamic states, many commentators argue that the
Qur'an forbids honor killings." Despite the widely held misperception that Islam sanctions
honor killings, "[m]urder is not prescribed to cleanse honor in any major interpretation
of Sharia (or Islamic law), including in the Quran or hadith (sayings and traditions of the
Prophet)." 2 In fact, the legal provisions in many countries that excuse or offer reduced
penalties for honor crimes83 stem not from Shari'a law but from the Napoleonic code and
the colonial era.
84
77 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Violence Against Women and "Crimes of Honour, " in "HONOUR": CRIMES, PARADIGMS,
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at xi, xii.
78 International Campaign Against Honour Killing, supra note 72.
79 Rochelle L. Terman, To Specify or Single Out: Should We Use the Term "Honor Killing"?, 7 MUSLIM WORLD J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (2010).
80 Cohan, supra note 14, at 196 ("Honor killings predate all modern religions, and originated among ancient
desert tribes."); Hussain, supra note 13, at 235 ("Derivations of honor crimes existed even before the advent
of Islam, and the concept of honor certainly was a part of the legal history of Western countries before its
institutionalization in Muslim countries.").
81 Shira T. Shapiro, She Can Do No Wrong: Recent Failures in America s Immigration Courts to Provide
Women Asylumfi'om "Honor Crimes" Abroad, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL'V & L. 293, 299 (2010)
("[T]he Koran, the central religious text of Islam, forbids honor killings.").
82 Terman, supra note 79, at 10. Lama Abu-Odeh describes the disagreement about whether Islamic law
supports honor-related violence as follows: "The Islamist legislature sitting in the shadow (the 'official'
religious intelligentsia)-waiting to take over the state-addressing the issue of honor killings, finds itself
producing differing opinions as to whether they are Islamic or not." Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73,
at 951.
83 Terman, supra note 79, at 10. (noting that "in many other countries, national legislation legitimizes honor
killing, or the killing of women by their relatives for sexual deviance").
84 Id. at 10.
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The victims of honor crimes are often young, unmarried women--daughters or
sisters." In these cases, efforts to control women's sexuality are designed to protect
virginity, whereas honor-related violence directed at married women is designed to protect
chastity.8 6 Perpetrators often commit honor crimes in response to rumors or mere suspicion
of a woman's sexual transgressions. 87 Families may also commit honor-related violence
against a female family member who has been raped and who is therefore seen as bringing
shame to her family.
8
In some countries, such as Pakistan, honor crimes were historically reserved for
couples who were caught in the act of adultery.8 9 In Sindh, a province of Pakistan, for
example, the alleged adulteress is labeled "kari," literally translated as "black woman,"
and her supposed lover "karo," "black man." 90 If the adultery is discovered or merely
alleged, often the woman's family will kill both the female family member and the man,
"with the complicity of the community."91 More recently in Pakistan, as in other countries,
the type of behavior that might trigger an honor crime has expanded to include women's
85 TAHIRA S. KHAN, BEYOND HONOUR: A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST EXPLANATION OF HONOUR RELATED VIOLENCE
42 (2006).
86 Cohan, supra note 14, at 186 ("As the embodiment of her family's honor, women must guard their virginity
and chastity-after all, 'a man's honor lies between the legs of a woman.' By engaging in a freely chosen illicit
sexual relationship, a woman undermines the ownership rights of others to her body and challenges traditional
social order." (quoting Ruane, supra note 8, at 1531)).
87 Shapiro, supra note 81, at 298-99 ("In 2007, the U.S. State Department reported that twenty-five percent
of honor crime victims in Jordan were killed after a mere 'suspicion' of involvement in an illicit relationship
and only fifteen percent were murdered after the family proved any relationship occurred.").
88 Yotam Feldner, Honor Murders: Why the Perps Get OffEasy, 7 MIDDLE E. Q., 41, 41 (2000) (relating
the story of Kifaya Husayn, who was murdered by her brother to "cleanse [his] honor" because she had been
raped by another of her brothers); Stephanie Eileen Nanes, Fighting Honor Crimes: Evidence of Civil Society
in Jordan, 57 MIDDLE E. J. 112, 118 (2003) ("Studies have shown that these killings can also be a result
of... the 'cleansing' of a girl who has been raped, sometimes by a family member."); Raped Girl Killed over
Family 'Honour,' COURIER MAIL (Aug. 10, 2011, 1:30 AM), http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/breaking-
news/raped-girl-killed-over-family-honour/story-e6freoo6-1225760438285 (reporting the arrest and charging
of a man who confessed to shooting his niece eight times after she had been raped so that he could "cleanse his
family's honour").
89 Warraich, supra note 75, at 79 ("Traditionally, 'honour killings' were committed or claimed to be
committed upon discovering a woman family member indulging in extramarital sex.").
90 AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN: HONOUR KILLINGS OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 3 (1999) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L,
PAKISTAN].
91 Id. at 5 (underscoring the notion of honor as property, in cases where the k]ari is killed but the karo
escapes, the karo, in order to preserve his life, is required to compensate the affected man for his lost honor).
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"expressions of autonomy by, for example, exercising choice in marriage or a decision to
seek divorce.
92
Some women resist the strict social codes imposed on them by their families.93 They
may engage in subtle or overt resistance. Some refuse the marriage arranged for them by
their families; 94 others resist stereotypical gender roles by engaging in premarital sexual
contact or insisting on a formal education. 95 Still others are simply falsely accused of
transgressing these social barriers.96
Women's resistance to these social and familial expectations is a powerful example of
women's agency. Describing the centrality of agency in our understanding of the multi-
dimensional subject, Ratna Kapur observes, "[f]oregrounding the resistance of the peripheral
subject scatters hegemonic understandings of culture and gender that are reproduced at the
international and domestic levels."97 Women's agency comes in many forms. It includes
both subtle and exaggerated acts of resistance by women who feel constrained in their
expressions of sexuality. It also includes women who exercise agency by imposing on
other women strict social codes that constrain sexuality. In this sense, women are acting to
preserve the value of honor property for the perceived benefit of the family as a whole. 98
The boundary-enforcing behaviors of these female family members are no less an exercise
of agency than the acts of resistance from those who seek to challenge social norms.
Although many family members may participate in the planning or decision to commit
an honor crime, those who carry out the violence are often young males within the family.99
92 Warraich, supra note 75, at 79.
93 Sev'er & Yurdakul, supra note 52, at 981-84 (providing several anecdotes of honor crime victims in Turkey
whose indiscretions range from going to a movie in the middle of the day to running away from home to marry a man
of her choice).
94 AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN, supra note 90, at 6 ("Expressing a desire to choose a spouse and marrying a partner of
one's choice are seen as major acts of defiance .. "); Sev'er & Yurdakul, supra note 52, at 981 (recounting the story
of Gonul Arslan who was strangled until presumed dead by a male family member after refusing to marry her cousin).
95 ANDREA PARROT & NINA CUMMINGS, FORSAKEN FEMALES: THE GLOBAL BRUTALIZATION OF WOMEN 174 (2006)
("Women bring shame upon the family for.., wanting to be educated.. . having premarital sex ....").
96 Nanes, supra note 88, at 118 (noting that in Jordan, autopsies have revealed that the overwhelming majority of
victims of honor killings that were accused of sexual impropriety were, in fact, virgins).
97 KaPuR, supra note 12, at 133.
98 Although outside the scope of this particular inquiry, the-notion that the collective good trumps the individual
good in the context of family honor is ripe for further exploration.
99 Warrick, supra note 18, at 324-25.
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This allows perpetrators to take advantage of common legal provisions that treat youth as
a mitigating factor in punishment. 00 Women within the family also often help to police
gender norms related to sexuality and support the use of violence against other female
family members.'0'
In some countries, the state imprisons potential female victims, purportedly for their
own safety and protection. 0 2 Although the state is taking concerted action to protect
potential victims, the actions are overbroad and misguided. Imprisoning women may
indeed prevent an honor crime from occurring, but it subjects women to a host of human
rights abuses related to custody and detention and punishes potential victims rather than
perpetrators. 03
C. The Legal System Response
In many countries, a local, informal decision-making process accompanies the formal
legal system."° This informal adjudication sometimes takes the form of local councils or
100 Chrstine Schirrmacher, Honour Killings and Emancipation-Gender Roles in Immigrant Culture Against the
Backdrop of a Middle East Understanding of "Honour" and "Shame," (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.
islaminstitut.de/uploads/media/Honour-killings-Emancipation.pdf (last visited June 28, 2012) ("Often a family will
get a very young male family member to carry out the deed, so that if the case ever comes before a court the penalty
will be a mild one.").
101 Sev'er & Yurdakul, supra note 52, at 973 ("Women are also expected to protect the namus [honor] of other
women and girls related to them, for example, their daughters and granddaughters.").
102 PARROT & CUMMINGS, supra note 95, at 177 ("More than twenty-five percent of the women incarcerated in
Amman's women's prison are there to seek protection from being killed for honor .... "); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 17, at 8 (discussing interviews with women in Jordan who "were incarcerated in
Amman's Jweideh Women's Correctional and Rehabilitation Centre, the only refuge available to them" and noting
that "[v]ictims of 'honor' crimes also include women-as many as forty at a given time and sometimes far more
according to some sources-who are incarcerated for their own protection.").
103 ALI, supra note 16, at 36 ("Where harassment, torture and illegal incarceration are the routine instruments of
law enforcement, even seeking the aid or protection of the police can put an ordinary citizen's dignity, sanity and
health in grave peril.").
104 Reem Abu Hassan & Lynn Welchman, Changing the Rules? Developments on "Crimes of Honour" in Jordan,
in "HoNoUR": CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at 199, 199 (noting that bodies of law
relevant to honor crimes include: "the rules of legal texts, the rules of judicial interpretation in the courts, and the
unwritten rules in different communities and sections of our society that have equal if not greater impact on the lives
and freedoms of women and girls").
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groups of community elders who preside over family disputes or other localized conflicts.' 05
Research and anecdotal evidence in some countries suggests that these local councils
may encourage honor-related violence or other extralegal, violent methods of conflict
resolution. °6 As I argue in Part III of this Article, campaigns to eradicate honor-related
violence will need to reform the formal legal provisions that tacitly endorse honor crimes
and also use a human rights framework to raise awareness and change patriarchal attitudes
among these local councils. This section, however, addresses the formal legal system's
response to honor-related violence.
The penal codes of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, among others, allow for a
reduction or elimination of penalties in cases involving honor killings.0 7 "From dowry
deaths in India to the 'legitimate defense of honor' in Brazil, many legal systems have found
formal or informal ways to excuse or mitigate the penalties for wife-killing."'0 8 Article 22
of Ecuador's penal code removes from criminal liability altogether a person who, in the
"legitimate defense of the marital honor and self morality," commits a violent act against
their spouse or "correspondent lover," including murder, if the person catches their spouse
in flagrante.0 9 Turkey legally distinguishes between manslaughter and "infanticide for
family honor," with the penalty for the former set at twenty-four to thirty years and that of
105 In Pakistan, for example, where the population is mostly rural, with a minority populating the urban
areas, "the tribal councils are the first, and often final, authoritative decision-makers. Such councils, which are
feudal vestiges, are composed only of men, particularly those who already wield financial or inherited power
within the tribes." Hussain, supra note 13, at 233. And in India, tribal councils called "khap panchayats"
often decide the fates of women accused of violating social norms, frequently sanctioning honor killings. See
Nilanjana S. Roy, A Challenge to Doing Gender Justice by Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/18/world/asia/I 8iht-letterl 8.html?pagewanted=all#; see also Baxi et al., supra note 69,
at 1243 ("Revenge rapes, burning down of homes of those judged to be transgressors of caste boundaries,
lynchings and beatings are all employed by these panchayats as means of disciplining the communal body.").
106 See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
107 Warrick, supra note 18, at 326. These provisions are found in "Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code,
Article 237 of the Egyptian Penal Code, Article 548 of the Syrian code (1949), and Article 562 of the Lebanese
code (1943, amended 1999)." Id. at 326 n.29.
108 Id. at 323.
109 Silvia Pimentel, Valkria Pandjiarjian & Juliana Belloque, The "Legitimate Defense of Honor," Or
Murder with Impunity? A Critical Study of the Legislation and Case Law in Latin America, in "HONOUR"
CRIMES, PARADIGMS, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 4, at 245, 247 ("[A]rticle 22 of the Penal Code
is still in force establishing that in the "legitimate defense of the marital honor and self morality" there is no
offense at all when one of the spouses kills, hurts, or strikes the other, or the "correspondent lover" at the
moment of the surprise of the flagrant adultery.").
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the latter at just four to eight years."10
Some countries have "heat of passion" provisions rather than provisions that explicitly
address the loss of honor. In the Mexican state of Oaxaca, Article 293 of the penal code
provides "inferior punishment to individuals who kill their spouses under the argument
of meeting him/her in sexual intercourse or close to its consummation.""' As of 1991,
Brazilian law still contained vestiges of the Portuguese colonial law that allowed a man,
.but not a woman, to kill his wife and her lover if he caught them in an adulterous act." 2
Although the law has formally eliminated the defense of honor, "social norms allow that
a man can legitimately kill his allegedly adulterous wife on the grounds of honor, and
this attitude has acquired the force of law through repeated judicial sanction.""' 3 One
international human rights organization expressed concern that courts accept "heat of
passion" or "violent emotion" defenses even in murder cases that indicate that a husband
killed his wife after substantial premeditation for honor-related transgressions. " 4
Still other jurisdictions have a combination of provisions that address honor-
related violence and "heat of passion" violence." 5 These "heat of passion" provisions
often complement the specific honor provisions of the penal code." 6 This combination
of provisions reflects two concepts, both identified with different historical roots. The
110 Dicle Kogacioglu, The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey, 15 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST
CULTURAL STUDS. 118, 123 (2004) ("In today's criminal code, concerns about family honor are, in fact, deemed
so important that they can be shown to be a mitigating condition even of infanticide or the abandonment of
a child. 'Infanticide for family honor,' the legal term for a crime differentiated from manslaughter, draws a
sentence of only four to eight years instead of the twenty-four to thirty years for 'regular' manslaughter (Article
453).").
Ill Silvia Pimentel et al., supra note 109, at 250-51 (quoting Reyes Terdn, director of the Women's Institute
of Oaxaca) ("In the Penal Code of the State of Oaxaca in Mexico, article 293 refers to the homicide for honor.
According to Reyes Terhn, 'the homicide for honor, known in the other states as homicide in the heat of
passion, guarantees an inferior punishment to individuals who kill their spouses under the argument of meeting
him/her 'in sexual intercourse or close to its consummation.'"") (quotation marks omitted).
112 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN BRAZIL 18 (1991).
113 Id. at 22.
114 Id. at 27.
115 See Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and Jordanian
Criminal Laws, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 251, 276-80 (2004) (discussing Jordan's use of both a "heat of
passion" statute and a provision covering general honor crimes).
116 See id. ("In 1964, however, the JCC reversed its position and held the applicability of Article 98 to Honor
Crimes, arguing it complements Article 340. The JCC held that if the high standard required by Article 340 is
not established the court can look to Article 98 for mitigating factors and reduction of punishment.").
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combination integrates the "heat of passion" concepts, which are more closely identified
with the West, and the "honor" provisions, which are commonly perceived as associated
with the East." 7 Lama Abu-Odeh argues that American and Arab legal systems embody
both honor and passion and exhibit some tension between the two concepts." 8 Building
on Abu-Odeh's important insight regarding the inter-relatedness of honor and passion, this
Article rejects the notion that the concepts of honor and passion operate in disconnected
and distinct ways in the East and the West.
Although these "heat of passion" provisions theoretically require a close temporal
connection between the discovery of the precipitating event and the violent act, some
courts have applied them in circumstances involving premeditated honor crimes. '19 A closer
examination of Jordanian law provides an illustration. Until 2001, when the Jordanian
government amended the provision to allow women to benefit from the mitigating provision
as well, 120 Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code stated, "He who surprises his wife,
or one of his female relatives committing adultery with somebody and kills, wounds, or
injures one or both of them shall be exempt from penalty.' 12 ' This provision derives from
the 1858 Ottoman Penal Code and the French Penal Code of 1810,122 Article 340 exempts
from punishment those who act to reclaim the family's honor by committing violence
against the offending spouse and her partner. 23 Despite its clear codification of honor and
117 Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking, supra note 58, at 289.
118 Id. at 292 ("Interestingly, it will turn out that that honor of one (the American) is the passion of the other
(the Arab), while the passion of one (the American) echoes the norms of honor of the other (the Arab).").
119 Hussain, supra note 13, at 232 (citing Kathryn Christine Arnold, Comment, Are the Perpetrators of
Honor Crimes Getting Away with Murder?: Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the
Convention of the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1343,
1368 (2001)).
120 For a complete description of the law reform process, see Warrick, supra note 18, at 328-36.
121 Nesheiwat, supra note 115, at 273.
122 Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 914 ("Article 340 was its historical origin in two legal
sources that are surprisingly harmonious when it comes to the issue of 'honor killings.' They are the Ottoman
Penal Code of 1858 and the French Penal Code of 1810.") Abu-Odeh notes that the "provision of the French
Penal Code was not abolished until 1975." Id. at 915.
123 PARROT & CUMMINGS, supra note 95, at 180 ("Jordanian Law considers murder a legitimate act of defense
when the act of killing another or harming another was committed as an act of his life, his honor, or somebody
else's life or honor.").
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passion concepts, Article 340 is rarely used as a defense for honor crimes. 2 4 Because it
requires surprise, it is inapplicable to many premeditated honor crimes.'2 5 Furthermore,
women are rarely caught in the act of adultery; "[i]n practice, women and girls are usually
killed well after whatever act they are believed to have committed .... Despite its
infrequent use-and even more infrequent success-Article 340 is the "basis of the social
understanding of the law's role" in crimes of honor; "[i]t is widely understood that the
behavior encompassed by the statute's description would discredit the honor of a woman's
(male) relatives, and that the law is meant to account for the natural response to such a
provocation.'
27
In contrast, Article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code is often invoked as a defense to
honor crimes. 128 Article 98 states: "He who commits a crime in a fit of fury caused by
an unrightful and dangerous act on the part of the victim, benefits from a reduction of
penalty.'1 29 Article 98 more closely resembles the Western "heat of passion" defense than
Article 340.130 Notably, courts may reduce punishments handed down under Article 98 to
just six months if the victim's family agrees not to press charges.'3' Because of the intra-
familial nature of honor-related violence, families often waive the criminal charges against
the perpetrators. 3 2 Thus, perpetrators frequently serve six-month sentences following the
waiver of charges; in fact, perpetrators who have admitted to murder sometimes walk out
124 Nanes, supra note 88, at 118 ("Yet, Article 340 has been applied only once in the 35 years that it has
been part of Jordanian law.").
125 ALAN GEORGE, JORDAN: LIVING IN THE CROSSFIRE 199 (2005) ("In practice, Article 340 has rarely been
invoked, if only because it is rare for a woman to be discovered inflagrante.").
126 Warrick, supra note 18, at 327.
127 Id. at 326.
128 GEORGE, supra note 125 ("The usual defence in honour crime cases has been Article 98 of the Penal
Code ... .
129 Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 924.
130 Nanes, supra note 88, at 118.
131 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 17, at 2 ("Under article 98 of the penal code,
this can be reduced to six months if the victim's family waives charges against the perpetrator.").
132 Id
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of the courtroom, having served six or more months prior to the hearing. 33 In Jordan, the
average sentence served for an honor killing is just seven-and-a-half months.'
3 4
Historically, the Jordanian Court of Cassation ("JCC") had interpreted the scope
of "wrongful and dangerous act" on the part of the victim quite narrowly.'35 Under this
narrower interpretation, "the court held a woman's dishonorable action, or even her
illegitimate pregnancy did not amount to a case of wrongful and dangerous act against
the male."' 36 The JCC, however, changed course in 1964 and interpreted Article 98's
"wrongful and dangerous act" language to include a broad range of behavior on the part
of the victim to justify a reduction in penalties, including anything from "the victim's
illegitimate pregnancy to walking alone at night."'37
The courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation of the scope of Article 98.138 In
one case, the JCC determined that two days was an insufficient cooling-down period and
issued a reduced penalty under Article 98 in a case in which a man murdered his sister two
133 Id. ("Indeed, it is common for killers, having freely admitted their crime and served six or more months
awaiting trial, to leave the courtroom as free men immediately after being found guilty.").
For example, a thirty-year-old man identified as Ziad H. who had murdered his divorced
sister for being absent from the family home for one week told authorities, "people started
talking about us, so I decided to kill her." A pathologist's report indicated that his sister,
whom he stabbed thirty times, had not been involved in sexual activity. The father of the
victim, who was also the father of the defendant, dropped charges. In January 2003, the
murderer was sentenced to six months for the "honor" crime due to the mitigation granted
under article 98. Having served the time while awaiting trial, he was freed.
Id. at 19.
134 PINAR ILKKARACAN, DECONSTRUCTING SEXUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES AND DISCOURSES 23
(2008) (concluding, based on research from 1998 and 2000, that the "average sentence served in Jordan is
seven-and-a-half months for an honor killing").
135 Nesheiwat, supra note 115, at 276 ("Prior to 1964, the Jordanian Court of Cassation ("JCC") held that
nothing less than a minor case of self-defense could be construed as 'wrongful and dangerous act' on the part
of the victim to justify the application of Article 98. Historically, the court held a woman's dishonorable action,
or even her illegitimate pregnancy did not amount to a case of wrongful and dangerous act against the male.").
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Lama Abu-Odeh, Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies, in FEMINISM &
ISLAM: LEGAL & LITERARY PERSP. 141, 161 (1996).
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days after discovering that she had allegedly committed adultery.' 39 Although there is some
inconsistency in the court's interpretation of Article 98, the JCC has interpreted Article 98
to include even honor crimes committed with premeditation. 40
Similar provisions exist in Pakistan's legal code. "Pakistan's crime of passion clause of
'grave and sudden provocation' was inherited from [the] British penal code, and although
the Pakistani clause was omitted in 1990, Pakistani courts have gradually reintroduced
the mitigating provision in their interpretations of the law to grant convicted defendants
more lenient sentences."'' It is not even always necessary that the perpetrator claim
"grave and sudden provocation."'4 2 Despite failing to plead sudden provocation, a court
accepted mitigating circumstances in the case of Muhammad Younis, who killed his wife,
claiming he had caught her with another man. 143 Although the evidence weighed against
the defendant, the court nevertheless stated, "The appellant had two children from his
deceased wife and when he took the extreme step of taking her life giving her repeated
knife blows on different parts of her body, she must have done something unusual to enrage
him to that extent.'
44
In many cases, the perpetrators of honor crimes specifically plan their crimes to take
advantage of the judicial system's mitigation clauses. Frequently, the victim's family,
when plotting an honor killing, will select as perpetrator a family member who is able to
139 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 17, at 19-20 ("In another reported case, a
man heard his sister referred to as a 'slut' and confronted her. She told him to 'mind his own business.' He
went to bed, awoke the next morning and strangled her with a phone cord. The High Criminal Court ruled:
'It does not matter that the defendant killed his sister hours after [learning of her supposed act]. He was still
under the influence of extreme anger, which caused him to lose his ability to think clearly because of the
unlawful act committed by his sister."'). Though the woman had been impregnated by a rapist, the Court
stated that "The victim's actions were an unlawful and dangerous act that brought disgrace and shame to her
family." Amman "Honor Killer" Gets One Year, BBC NEWS (June 1, 2003, 1:02 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk2/
hi/middle east/2954060.stm.
140 Id. at 2 ("While there is some evidence of greater sensitivity in recent years, the courts still routinely
accept a killer's excuse that he acted out of 'fury' and diminished capacity-even when the murder occurs
weeks after the alleged offensive act-and are willing to consider the slightest gestures of female autonomy as
provocations tainting family honor.").
141 Hussain, supra note 13, at 232.
142 AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN, supra note 90, at 13 ("In some cases, courts have found extenuating
circumstances even when the murderer did not claim to have been suddenly and severely provoked."). See id.
at 14-15.
143 Id. at 15.
144 Id.
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take advantage of youth mitigation provisions.145 In Turkey, for example, Hacer Felhan's
family took it as an insult to her honor when a friend dedicated a "love song" to her on
the radio.' 46 Hacer, fearing for her life, faked her own death and ran away to a friend's
house. 147 Eventually found by the police and returned to her family, she was executed by
her thirteen-year-old brother, Muhammed, whom the family had chosen to "clean their
namus [honor]."' 48 Because of his youth, Muhammed was sentenced to just ten years in
prison, serving only two.
149
In 1921, Italian scholar Mario Manfredini described the first prohibitions against
immodesty in the Italian penal code as follows: "[T]he equivalent of modesty in men is
jealousy and honour; i.e. the defence of their own personal value in society, the reaction
of the endangerment of their own property and goods."'' 0 Commenting on Manfredini's
observation, Maria Gabriella Bettiga-Boukerbout offers, "[a]cts that breached modesty
were therefore initially sanctioned because they jeopardized the man's exclusive enjoyment
of a woman, his right to possess her without interference." '"' According to this conception
of honor, a man acted to exclude other men from sexual access to a woman in his family in
an effort to protect male familial honor. The law recognized the need to protect honor as a
valuable good or form of property.
The Rocco Code, the Italian penal code of 1931, reflects the notion that a man is
entitled to go to great lengths to reclaim honor property once it has been taken through
the "immoral" acts of others. Article 587 of the Rocco Code imposes a penalty of three
to seven years in jail for someone who kills his spouse, sister, or daughter after she has
145 Kogacioglu, supra note 110, at 123 ("Such reductions are often combined with age reductions, leading
to cases in which the family of the victimized woman designates a younger member to commit the crime so
as to benefit from all possible legal mechanisms that can lessen the sentence."); see also Yakin Ertiirk, Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women of the Hum. Rts. Council, Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled Human Rights Council: Addendum: Mission to Turkey, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/4/34/Add.2 (Jan. 5, 2007) ("A young man or boy is often assigned to commit the crime because
it is hoped that the young offender will receive a more lenient sentence.").
146 Sev'er & Yurdakul, supra note 52, at 983-84.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 984.
149 Id.
150 Bettiga-Boukerbout, supra note 55, at 231.
151 Id.
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dishonored her family through "unlawful sexual relations."' 5 2 This provision and other
explicit references to honor were removed from the penal code in 198 1.- 3
Despite the fact that some jurisdictions have eliminated honor-related provisions
and that others have laws that, on their face, do not apply to premeditated honor crimes,
many courts continue to find ways to excuse honor-related violence or reduce penalties
for offenders.'54 The law thus reinforces the perception that male possessors of honor
property may vigilantly protect the value of their honor property, even through gender-
based violence. By significantly reducing penalties for perpetrators of honor crimes or
crimes committed by a cuckolded man that blur the line between honor-motivated crime
and sudden provocation, the law signals a social acceptance of honor-related violence. 55
D. The Economy of Honor
Honor has significant value; for many, it determines self-worth. There are three primary
ways in which honor and economics intersect. First, honor is itself a form of currency.
15 6
Second, honor-related violence often results from a cost-benefit analysis within families. 57
Third, families sometimes use honor fraudulently for economic gain. 58 These links between
honor and economics reinforce the law's implicit treatment of honor as property.
1. Honor as Currency
As Charles Reich famously recognized in 1964 in The New Property, "more and more
of our wealth takes the form of rights and status rather than of tangible goods."' 59 Forms of
152 Article 587 of the Rocco Code states, "Whoever discovers unlawful sexual relations ... on the part of
their spouse, daughter or sister and in the fit of fury occasioned by the offence to their or their family's honour
causes their death, shall be punished with a prison term from three to seven years." Id. at 234.
153 Id. at 239.
154 Hussain, supra note 13, at 235 ("Even when an honor crime conviction is obtained, eighty-five percent
of perpetrators are either acquitted or given lenient sentences.").
155 Obviously, there are differences between a typical honor crime and a typical case involving sudden
provocation, but there are many cases which blur the line between honor and passion. It is these line-blurring
provocation cases with which I am concerned here.
156 See discussion infra Part I.D. 1.
157 See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
158 See discussion infra Part I.D.3.
159 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE'L.J. 733, 738 (1964).
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wealth can be culturally determined. 160 In high-tech virtual worlds, academics and garners
are beginning to identify the ways in which reputation operates as a form of property. 6'
"Virtual reputational economies show that reputation can be gained, lost, traded, protected,
and shared, all in property-like fashion, without regard to whether it has independent
economic value.' 1 62 Recent scholarship in the world of virtual economies has explored
the ways in which status and reputation function as property, including similarities in the
transfer and protection of reputational property.'63 The fact that reputation in the virtual
world lacks market value in the real-world economy is irrelevant to its operation as a form
of Reich's "New Property.'
'1 64
In much the same way that virtual reputation is a form of property that is disconnected
in any concrete sense from the market economy, so too is honor property. Virtual
reputations are owned, "whether or not those reputations ever interact with the real-
world economy."'' 65 Honor property sometimes has measurable economic value-not
because it is alienable, but because its absence can have serious economic consequences.
The human rights organization, Amnesty International, describes the financial impact
of familial shame, noting that "[t]he livelihood of entire families may be affected:
a shopkeeper who does not 'cleanse his family honor' may'lose all his customers,
for example."'66 A family's shame may result in fewer economic transactions with
neighbors, decreased odds that other daughters in the family will be able to marry, and
a compromised ability to make financially beneficial alliances within the community.
167
160 Id. (noting that forms of wealth "are constantly changing and differ in every culture").
161 Thanks go to my colleague, Joshua Fairfield, an expert in the legal regulation of virtual worlds, for
pointing out the burgeoning scholarship on reputation as property in the virtual world. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher,
Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 120 (2009).
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., id.
164 See id.
165 Id.
166 AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY: WOMEN CONFRONTING FAMILY VIOLENCE 18 (2004), http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/EUR44/013/2004/en/176dcc64-d5ed-I dd-bb24-1fb85fe~fa05/eur440132004en.pdf [hereinafter
AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY].
167 Id. (noting that, conversely, when women fail to adhere to honor codes, the "livelihood of entire families
may be affected: a shopkeeper who does not 'cleanse his family honour' may lose all his customers, for
example"); see also Faqir, supra note 16, at 72 (recounting the story of Basma told in the introduction of this
Article).
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Even when there is no direct connection to market transactions or measurable
economic consequences, however, honor property, like virtual reputations, resembles other
forms of property. "[H]onorable deeds are.., looked upon as a valued possession.' ' 68 The
conceptual similarities between honor property and other forms of property help to explain
why some legal systems have treated honor as property, albeit without doing so explicitly.
The meanings of honor and reputation, more broadly, are socially constructed. Cory
Doctorow's science fiction novel, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, 69 compellingly.
illustrates the degree to which our notions of property are socially constructed. Doctorow
creates an imaginary world in which money is replaced by the currency of the "Whuffie."' 7 °
The Whuffie is a reputation-based currency: the value of a person's Whuffie fluctuates
according to that person's behavior and the public's perception of that behavior.'' Honor
operates in the real world the way that Whuffie operates in Doctorow's fictional world.
Honor is a form of wealth that determines status and evokes desperate and violent efforts
to retain or regain it.
Vigilant protection of honor property is also deeply constitutive of masculinity.
172
Honor, as a form of wealth or property, thus, determines status and manliness. With both
masculinity and property at stake, the cultural stakes are high.
2. Honor and Cost-Benefit Assessments
Violence against women occurs in all communities and across all socio-economic
strata. 173 However, studies suggest that honor crimes are more prevalent in "economically
168 Sev'er & Yurdakul, supra note 52, at 971-72.
169 CORY DOCTORow, DOWN AND OUT IN THE MAGIC KINGDOM (2003).
170 Id. at 5.
171 Id. ("[W]huffie recaptured the true essence of money .... By measuring the thing that money really
represented-your personal capital with your friends and neighbors-you more accurately gauged your
success.").
172 DAVID GHANIM, GENDER AND VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 43 (2009) ("A man's masculinity is socially
constructed through his ability to deny other men sexual access to his female relatives. Therefore masculinity
is also related to punishing transgressions of this moral code.").
173 See Pamela Goldberg & Nancy Kelly, International Human Rights and Violence Against Women, 6
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 195 (1993) ("[P]hysical abuse of women is pervasive, cutting across cultural, class, and
economic lines ...."); see also E.S.C. Res. 1990/15, Annex 23 (recognizing "that violence against women in
the family and society is pervasive and cuts across lines of income, class and culture"); Moira L. McConnell,
Violence Against Women: Beyond the Limits of the Law, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 899, 899 ("Violence against
women exists in various forms in everyday life in all societies.").
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disenfranchised, poverty-stricken areas."' 7 4 In a study conducted to determine whether
there was a significant correlation between honor crimes and communities living in
poverty, Jordanian economist Dr. Yusuf Mansur developed a cost-benefit model to explain
the economic aspects of honor crimes:
The supply of crime is modeled as a choice between legitimate activities
such as work on the one hand and criminal activities such as killing a
female for breaking the honor code of the community, on the other. The
choice depends on the net payoff of the ... criminal activity itself-which
may include increased inheritance to the perpetrator, job gain and positive
reputation in the community-above all other costs associated with the
crime. 1
Under Mansur's model, the cost side of the calculus includes the lost wages from
employment that result from incarceration, direct costs such as the cost of a gun, and the
cost of government-imposed penalties in the form of fines or incarceration. 76 Indeed,
"[i]n societies where no punishment is handed out for committing 'honor' crimes and where
the perpetrator is rewarded in terms of social standing and job opportunities or commercial
relationships, [honor crimes] tend[] to have a higher propensity."'
' 77
This kind of cost-benefit analysis suggests that increasing the costs or decreasing
the benefits of honor crimes will help to combat them. On the cost side, increased legal
penalties (if such penalties were actually enforced by the state) could lead to fewer honor
crimes. 78 Another important cost calculation is the value of women's lives within families
and communities. Increasing women's economic value to the family would theoretically
increase the cost of honor killings. Economic empowerment for women then becomes
an important strategy to increase the financial cost to families who sacrifice mothers,
daughters, and sisters in the name of reclaiming honor property.
174 MANSUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 26.
175 Id. at 33-34. ("These costs include the foregone wages from continuing legitimate activities such as
work in current employment, the direct costs of the crime such as cost of a gun, knife; elaborate criminal
designs to commit the crime.., and the expected future penalties from the crime (fines, incarceration, and other
sanctions by the state or the community).").
176 Id. at 34-35.
177 Id. at 35.
178 This assumes punishment is an effective deterrent to honor crimes.
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Honor-related violence occurs across socio-economic groups in many communities. 7 9
In fact, one of the most notorious cases in Jordan involved Samia Sawar, the daughter
of "one of the most successful businessmen in Peshawar," the capital of a province in
Pakistan, whose husband was abusive. 80 Though her parents allowed her to return home
to escape the abuse, they refused to allow her to get a divorce because a divorce would
damage the family honor.'8' When she pursued a divorce despite her parents' demand,
she was met at her lawyer's office by her mother and a man who was introduced as her
mother's driver.8 2 Immediately upon entering the lawyer's office, the "driver" drew a gun
and shot Samia in the head.'83
Sociological research, however, suggests that the incidence of honor-related violence is
higher in economically disadvantaged communities.'84 Despite the potential misuse of such
data to reinforce the class bias of elites, the data is relevant when considering the economic,
property-based incentives at play in the context of honor-related violence. More research
is needed to fully explore the potential links between structural poverty and honor-related
violence.
3. Honor-Related Violence as Cover
Because in some countries the penalties for honor-related violence are considerably
more lenient than those for comparable crimes, perpetrators sometimes disguise other
forms of violence as honor crimes.'85 In some cases, a male family member may seek to
extort money from an unrelated male by claiming that the non-family member has shamed
179 See, e.g., Kulwicki, supra note 69, at 81 (presenting the results of a survey on honor crimes and noting
that victims varied from "belonging to 'very good' socioeconomic class to middle or poor class"); Safilios-
Rothschild, supra note 69, at 210 (noting that honor crimes occur in both urban and rural communities).
180 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: How MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 147 (2010).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 148.
183 Id.
184 See PARROT & CUMMINGS, supra note 95, at 175 (commenting that "honor killings are most common in
poor, rural areas").
185 Hussain, supra note 13, at 229 ("The justification of the honor crime is used as a cover-up for extortion
and blackmail for the purposes of increasing personal wealth.").
23.2
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
the family by engaging in sexual contact with a woman in the family. 8 6 The accused
man, although not the female family member, may escape with his life if he is willing to
pay compensation for the alleged loss of honor.'87 This extortion scheme often involves
murdering a female relative to reclaim honor lost as a result of the fictional affair.'88 In this
scenario, the male family member manipulates honor property and sacrifices a sister or
daughter for economic gain.
Male family members also kill female family members in an effort to secure an
increased share of inheritance.'89 Fadia Faquir notes, "a number of honour killings are in
fact economic crimes, committed against female family members with whom there is a
dispute about inheritance."' 9 Honor thus becomes a proxy for other motivations.
In some communities, dishonor results from a woman who refuses to marry the man
her family has selected as her prospective husband.' 9' Jagmati Sangwan, president of the
Haryana All India Democratic Women's Association, suggests that the issue of marital
choice for women is "deeply threatening to the panchayats[,]" or local councils, some
of which have been accused of encouraging or ordering honor crimes. 192 According to
Sangwan, the issue of marital choice as a trigger for honor crimes is "a question of property
186 AMNESTY INT'L, PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE NAME OF HONOUR 25 (1999) [hereinafter
AMNESTY INT'L, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN] ("Reports abound about men who have killed other men in murders
not connected with honour issues who then kill a woman of their own family as alleged kari to camouflage the
initial murder as an honour killing.").
187 Id. at 8 ("Justice means restoring the balance by compensation for damage. The karo who gets away
has to pay compensation in order for his life to be spared. Compensation can be in the form of money or the
transfer of a woman or both.").
188 Hussain, supra note 13, at 229 ("For example, in order to blackmail a rival man to extract money, a
husband may kill his wife and assert that she had an extramarital affair with the rival; the rival male would
then be forced to pay a heavy sum of money or transfer property to the husband in order to preserve his life.").
189 KARO KARl, TORTORA, SIYAHKARI, KALA KALI, THERE Is No HONOUR IN KILLING, NATIONAL SEMINAR REPORT
26 (Nabila Malick, Ishrat Saleem, Insha Hamdani & Shirkat Gah eds., 2003), http://www.boell-pakistan.org/
downloads/Karo Kari Tor Tora.pdf [hereinafter KARO KARI] ("Another common motive is to usurp woman's
share of inheritance. So accusing her of being kari and murdering her prevents not only loss of property but
provides the added gain of compensation from whoever is accused as karo.").
190 Faqir, stpra note 16, at 72 (internal citations omitted).
191 AMNESTY INTIL, PAKISTAN, supra note 90, at 6 ("Women who are disowned by a family over a marriage
are cut loose from their social moorings and become vulnerable to exploitation."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 17, at I ("In Jordan, a woman's life is at risk if she engages in 'immoral or
shameful' acts, such as ... marrying someone of whom her family does not approve... :")
192 Roy, supra note 105.
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rights."' 93 Families often insist that daughters and sisters "marry outside their villages,
on the assumption that a woman who moves away can lay less claim to her paternal
inheritance."' 94 A woman who refuses to accept her family's economically motivated
spousal choice may, therefore, be seen to have dishonored her family.' 95 As a result, she
may be vulnerable to honor-related violence or to other forms of economically motivated
violence masquerading as honor-related violence.
My normative claim is that the notion of honor as property must be altered to include
women as potential honor property holders and redefined so that its accretion in value is no
longer contingent on women's behavior. This approach is consistent with an understanding
of honor as valuable social currency which should be available to women on equal terms
with men. Women do, at times, control honor property and accumulate honor in their own
right. Too often, however, women's roles in the familial accumulation of honor property
are limited to value preservation through virginity and chastity. The normative claim that
honor must be disassociated from the strict policing of women's sexuality reflects the
pragmatic conclusion that honor, defined with or without reference to women's sexuality,
will continue to be culturally salient within many communities for some time.
II. Viewing Honor Through the Lens of Property
In order to explore honor concepts through the lens of property,'96 let us conceive of




196 This Article draws inspiration from Cheryl Harris's 1993 groundbreaking article, Whiteness as Property,
in which she "examines how whiteness, initially constructed as a form of racial identity, evolved into a form of
property, historically and presently acknowledged and protected in American law." Cheryl Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1993).
197 "Although by popular usage property describes 'things' owned by persons, or the rights of persons with
respect to a thing, the concept of property prevalent among most theorists, even prior to the twentieth century,
is that property may 'consist[] of rights in 'things' that are intangible, or whose existence is a matter of legal
definition."' Id. at 1725 (citing Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in NoMos
XXII: PROP. 101, 104 (1980)).
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members.'98 Honor property is located in the bodies of the sisters, daughters, mothers,
and wives of these male property holders.'99 I do not claim that women themselves are the
property of men in the family. The assertion that women are themselves property ignores
women's agency and fails to recognize the many ways in which women resist categorical
victimhood. Rather, my claim is that the legal system has implicitly treated honor as a form
of property that is owned by men. The value of honor property fluctuates according to the
behavior of female family members.20 Honor property is derived from socially respectable
behavior of female relatives."' When female family members act "honorably," the value
of honor property increases for the family as a whole.0 2 When female family members act
"dishonorably," or are merely perceived to have acted "dishonorably," the value of honor
property decreases-sometimes significantly.0 3
As noted above, there are real economic costs associated with a decrease in the value of
honor property. The community may ostracize all family members, community members
198 See AMNESTY INT'L, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 186, at 11 ("Ghairat [honor] is closely linked
with izzat, respect or standing in society. Izzat bases itself on possession, wealth, property. 'A man's property,
wealth and all that is linked with these is the sum total of his honour value."') (quoting Nafisa Shah, Honour
Killings: Code of Dishonour, THE REV. November 19-25, 1998, at 7). "A key observation is that 'although
honour is located in material wealth, the language and expression of honour reside in the body.' Id. (quoting
Shah, supra, at 8).
199 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM?, supra note 54, at 43 ("The high incidence of sexual
assault in [Pakistan] is partly fostered by the societal subordination of women to men, by the custom of
avenging oneself upon one's enemies by raping their women, who are seen as repositories offanlilv honor, and
by the impunity with which these crimes are carried out.") (emphasis added).
200 See BOURDIEU, supra note 1, at 45 (explaining that the value of alliances gained through the marriage of
women, and therefore the symbolic profit they can yield, "partly depends on the symbolic value of the women
available for exchange, that is to say, on their reputation and especially their chastity").
201 See Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 917-18 (explaining that, in honor cultures, a woman
must maintain both a biological and a social virginity, and by violating the regulations and prohibitions meant
to guard one's physical virginity, a woman loses her social virginity and causes dishonor to her family).
202 See Joanne Payton, Collective Victims, Collective Crimes: A Case Study of the Murder ofBanaz Mahmod,
in HONOUR, VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 67, 68 (Mohammad Mazher Idriss & Tahir Abbas eds., 2011) (noting
that a marriage can produce new alliances, and these alliances can facilitate connections to prestigious allies).
These new allegiances, in turn, can produce increased economic opportunities for the patrilineal family unit as
a whole. Id. The creation of prodigious new alliances, however, is dependent on the women being "offered for
exchange" having a reputation for chastity. Id.
203 See Vandello, supra note 5, at 998 (noting that "women carry great influence in determining the
reputation of a family" and that "[w]omen have both negative power (they can 'stain' the family honor through
their behaviors) and positive power (... they can increase the reputation of the family by marrying up in the
social chain).").
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may refuse to patronize the family business, or the daughters in the family may be unable
to marry,204 increasing costs for the natal family that must continue to support them. Within
many communities, there is a widespread belief that the only way to restore value to honor
property is by killing the female family member who allegedly engaged in "dishonorable"
behavior.205 In many countries, the law makes allowances for those who act to reclaim their
honor property-even when such acts involve extreme forms of violence against a family
member.
Property theory may shed some light on the ways in which law has implicitly treated
honor as a form of property held by men, with unfortunate consequences for women in
those communities. Although this section focuses on property theory principles as they
have evolved in the United States, the principles, broadly defined, are replicated in some
form in many formerly colonial states. 206 My intent here is not to argue that the theories
themselves drive interpretation in any particular national courts. Rather, I argue that
understanding the underlying property theories, many of which surface in vaguely similar
forms in various parts of the world as a result of colonialism, 20 7 will help us to critique and
fine-tune the application of property principles to the honor context.
Property is not easily defined in the law. As a result, there are multiple theories that
attempt to classify property and to determine what counts as property under the law. 208 Many
of the underlying theoretical principles help to explain why legal systems might implicitly
treat honor as a form of property.209 As I demonstrate, a number of property law concepts
are particularly salient in recognizing the ways in which law has treated honor as property.
The relevant property concepts fall roughly into two conceptual categories: property as
204 Faqir, supra note 16, at 72 (recounting the story of Basma told in the introduction of this Article).
205 See, e.g., Asa Elden, Men s Violence and Women ' Responsibility: Mothers' Stories About Honor
Volence, in HONOUR, VIOLENCE, WOMEN AND ISLAM 128, 133 (Mohammad Mazer tdriss & Tahir Abbas eds.,
2011) ("Only when a woman who is branded as a whore no longer exists, socially or physically can the honour
of the collective be restored. Reputation may thus become a question of life and death."); Meltem Mfiftiiler-
Bac, Turkish Women s Predicament, 22 WOMEN'S STUDS. INT'L FORUM 303, 309 (1999) ("Nanus can only be
cleansed-because it has been dirtied by the woman-by blood; so the woman has to be killed by one of the
male members of the family").
206 John Sheehan, Conceptualising Property Rights Research, 12 PAC. RIM PROP. RES. J. 389, 391
("[T]he historic roots of property rights in other common law countries is the legacy of a historical colonial
process. . . ").
207 See id.
208 See discussion infra Part IL.A-B.
209 See id.
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power and property as communication. Although these principles offer analytical insight
into the law's implicit treatment of honor as a form of property, I argue in Part III that,
as a normative matter, we must refine the understanding of honor as property to include
women as rights holders with rights to honor property, which is defined without reference
to women's sexuality.
A. Property as Power
1. First Possession Through Discovery or Conquest
The first possession rule guides courts in awarding property rights to those who
first possessed a disputed, previously unowned property.210 Not surprisingly, courts have
struggled to determine the precise meaning and parameters of "possession."2 1 Generally,
the law rewards those who are able to clearly articulate a claim to previously unowned or
undiscovered territory.2 2 In the honor context, the "previously unowned or undiscovered
territory" is the virginal, female body. The value of honor property is correlated with
the notion of the undiscovered female body. Once, however, the female body has been
"discovered," so to speak, either through premarital sex or even rape, the familial honor is
so devalued that it triggers an attempt to reclaim that value through violence directed at the
female family member.
Articulations of possession can also be assertions of power. In other words, those.
who define "possession" in any legal regime often do so in a way that reflects their own
210 See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 212-15 (1845) (discussing the various areas of law
in which the legal maxim, "quiprior est Tempore, potior est Jure" [he has the better title who was first in point
of time] has been applied).
211 See Nat'l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) ("[B]oth in common speech and in legal
terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning than possession."); see also FREDERICK POLLOCK &
ROBERT SAMUEL WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW I (1888) ("[A]s the name of Possession is
... one of the most important in our books, so it is one of the most ambiguous."); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE
285 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947) ("In the whole range of legal theory there is no conception more
difficult than that of possession.").
212 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 258 ("Occupancy is the taking possession
of those things which before belonged to nobody. This, as we have seen.... is the true ground and foundation
of all property .... [H]e who could first declare his intention of appropriating anything to his own use, and, in
consequence of such intention, actually took it into possession, should thereby gain the absolute property of
it .. "); Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 74 ("For the common law, possession or 'occupancy' is the origin
of property.") (emphasis in original).
236 23.2
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
interests.2 3  A classic case in United States jurisprudential history, Johnson and Graham s
Lessee v. M'Intosh,2 14 illustrates the operation of this definitional power in a rights contest
concerning territorial conquest. The case involved the colonization of the "New World"
and the dispossession of indigenous peoples.
In Johnson, the dispute centered on land to which two different parties claimed title-
Johnson through purchase from a Native American tribe and M'Intosh through a land patent
obtained from the federal government.2"5 Cheryl Harris describes the Court's assessment
as follows: "Because the land had been left in its natural state, untilled and unmarked
by human hands, it was 'waste,' and, therefore, the appropriate object of settlement and
appropriation."2 6 As Harris suggests, in other words, the courts only accepted the cultural
practices of whites as methods for demonstrating legal possession, effectively making
"whiteness" a prerequisite for property ownership.217
In much the same way, courts have implicitly recognized a male interest in honor
property. Women are required to conform to strict expectations regarding chastity.2"8 This
compliance with social expectations is, in fact, what creates value in honor property.
Despite this role in value-creation, however, women are not the recognized holders of
honor property. Women's efforts to increase the value of honor property are erased by
cultural scripts that emphasize the role of men in safeguarding familial honor. Like the
indigenous peoples in Johnson, women's control over honor property is rendered invisible
and thus becomes legally insufficient to articulate a possessory claim to honor property.
The doctrines of first possession and discovery within property theory have particular
resonance in the context of honor property. The law rewards property holders who are
213 Cheryl Harris notes that early American property law defined "possession" to "include only the cultural
practices of whites" and that "[t]his definition laid the foundation for the idea that whiteness-that which
whites alone possess-is valuable and is property." This redefinition essentially nullified first possession rights,
thus justifying white conquest. Harris, supra note 196, at 1721.
214 Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
215 Id.
216 Harris, supra note 196, at 1721-22.
217 Id. at 1721, 1724.
218 In fact, at least one local governor in Afghanistan forces women to suffer the humiliation of "chastity
checks." Drumbl, supra note 16, at 358 ("Ismail Khan, the Governor of Herat, has forced women to undergo
'chastity checks' and has forbidden them to shake the hands of foreign men.").
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able to clearly articulate a claim to previously unowned or undiscovered territory.21 9 In the
honor context, "first possession" symbolizes the loss of virginity. For unmarried daughters
or sisters, the value of honor property corresponds to the notion of the undiscovered
body, or territory. First possessors of honor property include fathers, brothers, and other
family members who have a stake in loudly and publicly maintaining the virginity of their
daughters/sisters, which is explicitly calibrated to the value of honor property.
2. Occupancy Theory
As with common law first possession, occupancy theory provides a rationale for
recognizing as superior the property claims of someone who establishes possession through
occupation or control over the disputed property.220 Occupancy is one among many legally
cognizable property rights. Because one may establish occupancy through demonstrated
control over property, it, too, resonates with the notion of honor as property in which male
family members work hard to exert control over honor property.
Once occupancy has been established, the law generally protects a continuing
expectation of ownership based on an assertion of control over the property in question.
22
1
Property law, in fact, protects expectations: the law "recognize[s] and protect[s] even the
expectation of rights as actual legal property. '222 As a social construct, the law privileges
the expectations of some above others. 223 Male members of the natal family who exert
control over female members in an effort to protect the value of honor property establish
themselves as "occupants" in the property through such control over women's actions.
219 Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 74 ("For the common law, possession or "occupancy" is the origin
of property.") (emphasis in original).
220 See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 51 (T. Knox trans., 1821)
("[M]y inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to make it my property; to secure this
end occupancy is requisite. The embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognisability
by others. The fact that a thing of which I can take possession is a res nullius is a self-explanatory negative
condition of occupancy, or rather it has a bearing on the anticipated relation to others.").
221 Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, in PERSPECTIVES OF PROPERTY LAW 178
(Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackennan eds., 1995) (noting that "[c]onventions favouring
possessors can be found everywhere" and providing as the "purest" example the common law principle that "a
right to a parcel of land or to a right of way can be established by a long period of undisputed occupation or use").
222 john a. powell (intentionally lower case), New Property Disaggregated: A Model to Address Employment
Discrimination, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 363, 366 (1990).
223 Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 651 (1988) ("It is not the case
that everyone in our society has equal access to wealth and power or that opportunities in the marketplace are even
roughly equal.").
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Gendered conceptions of honor are imbued with expectations about women's future
behavior. Family members' expectations of the sexual behavior of their daughters/sisters
are central to familial notions of honor. By recognizing and protecting honor property
through minimal or greatly reduced penalties for violent efforts to reclaim it, legal systems
reinforce the expectation that women conform to rigid ideals of virginal behavior.
Describing how white privilege in the United States became a property right, Cheryl
Harris observes: "Because the law recognized and protected expectations grounded in white
privilege ... these expectations became tantamount to property that could not permissibly
be intruded upon without consent. 224 In much the same way that racial privilege became
an expectation for whites in the United States, the expectation of continued control over
honor property instantiates this form of property in the legal systems of some countries.
The mostly male family members who invest their labor in protecting the value of
honor property through control over the actions of women in their natal families certainly
have an expectation of continued control. Men's control over the sexuality of women
in their natal family often continues even after the woman marries. 25 At that point, her
husband may also share control, but male members of the natal family rarely relinquish
it. 2 6 In the case of honor property, this expectation of control is constitutive of the self; it
becomes a measure of family identity and self-worth. Like Harris's notion of whiteness,
honor is "an 'object' over which continued control was-and is-expected. '227 The law
reflects this understanding of honor and, therefore, makes allowances for those who seek
to reclaim it or preserve it through socially sanctioned violence.
3. Labor Theory
Lockean labor theory tells us, "Whatsoever [one] removes out of the state that nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that
is his own, and thereby makes it his property.'228 According to Locke, a thing derives its
224 Harris, supra note 196, at 1731.
225 MANSUR ET AL., supra note 6 at 16 ("In the event that a woman is perceived to have acted against
the traditional ethical code, it is the patrilineal family, not the woman, on whom 'honor' is lost. According
to widespread cultural values, it is possible to reclaim or repair family honor by punishing the woman. In
conservative families, this reparation may translate into ending her life.").
226 Id.
227 Writing about race, Harris observes, "Whiteness was an 'object' over which continued control was-and
is-expected." Harris, supra note 196, at 1730 (emphasis added).
228 LOCKE, supra note 37, at 19 (emphasis in original).
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value from someone's investment of labor, and, as a result, the person who invested that
labor deserves to call the property his or her own.22 9
In the honor context, family members vigilantly police the behavior of women in the
family.23° Women and girls learn to act in a way that is consistent with chastity and honor
at a young age.23' They conform their behavior to an "elaborate system of commands
and prohibitions.""23 Women's alleged violations of the social code range from relatively
minor transgressions, such as being seen talking with a man, to what are perceived to be
more serious transgressions, such as being accused of illicit sexual contact.23 3 Family and
community members enforce this social code by imposing sanctions on women, including
"the threat of physical punishment, spatial entrapment through segregation of gender
spaces, and the active mobilization of the institutions of social gossip and reputation." '234
The policing of women's behavior is labor-intensive. The mostly male possessors
of honor property go to great lengths-and invest considerable labor-in preserving the
value of honor property by restricting women's behavior. Consistent with Lockean labor
229 See Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEx. L. REv. 715, 742 (2003) (noting that Lockean labor
theory may "be characterized as one of moral desert: the law grants a person a property right in a thing because that
person deserves it as a reward for the virtue of having created the major part of its value").
230 See Payton, supra note 202, at 69 ("The self-interested vigilance of brothers and fathers to maintain the
family reputation creates a level of surveillance of women which any totalitarian state would envy.").
231 Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 918. An example of early gender performance is sequestration,
orpurdah, in Pakistan:
Starting at puberty, a woman must.., observe certain rules of behavior both inside and outside
the house. The indoor restrictions would prohibit admittance of any male other than from the
prescribed list of close relativts. The outdoor restrictions would require her to cover herself
completely except for the upper part of the face. She must dress modestly and use a veil.
Izzud-Din Pal, Wonen and Islam in Pakistan, 26 MIDDLE E. STUDS. 449, 450 (1990) (citing ABUL A'LA MAUOOODI,
PURDAH (12th ed., 1967)).
232 Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 918.
233 PARROT & CUMMINGS, supra note 95, at 174-75 (A perceived sexual transgression can consist of, but
is not limited to, the following actions: being "raped, . . wanting to be educated,... selecting [one's] own
spouse[], . . . marrying outside [one's] caste or class, . . marrying outside [one's] ethnicity, . . . marrying
outside [one's] nationality .... not obeying [one's] husband,... having premarital sex,... having extramarital
sex,... being pregnant outside of wedlock.... being suspected of having lost [one's] virginity,. .. being seen
with or talking to a man other than a relative, [causing one's husband to want] another wife, [having one's]
whereabouts ... unaccounted for during [a] time [one] could have been with a man.") (emphasis in original).
234 Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings, supra note 73, at 919.
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theory, those family members have mixed their labor with the honor property and have, in
fact, worked to preserve or increase its value. As a result of this labor, the law implicitly
recognizes a property interest in honor held by those who work to preserve its value, namely
the predominantly male family members who require strict adherence to social norms from
the women in their families. There is, thus, a Lockean reward for actively policing the
boundaries of women's sexuality.
Critical race theorists have offered an important critique of Lockean labor theory.
235
Because slave labor was not treated as labor in the Lockean sense, critics have rightly
charged that the theory reflects a privileged, white account of labor and fails to adequately
account for coercive or slave labor.236 Lockean labor theory, therefore, privileges some
forms of labor over others. In the honor context, a similar critique applies. A feminist
critique of Lockean labor theory reveals why male efforts to preserve honor are rewarded
as useful labor, while women's own efforts to maintain family honor are largely invisible.
Men thus reap the benefits of enhanced-value honor property, even when women have acted
with agency to protect the family's honor through self-policing or policing the behavior of
other women in the family. Lockean labor theory, therefore, sheds light on the ways in
which labor may increase the value of honor property, but its value is limited because it
fails to fully account for women's agency and women's self-regulatory, value-enhancing
behavior.
4. Exclusion
The right to exclude is one of the core tenets of modem property theory.237 In the
context of honor property, exclusion means excluding others from gaining sexual access to
the family's daughters, sisters, or wives, thereby diminishing the value of honor property.
Through this exclusion, the property holder both establishes the value of honor property
and asserts a possessory claim to it.
235 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 979 (1982) ("[1]f Locke's
claim is that property is justified because it is a condition necessary to produce or sustain free individuals,
his theory carries the inherent limitation that any form of property incompatible with free individuals is not
justified.").
236 See Harris, supra note 196, at 1727-28 (discussing how Lockean labor theory was used to justify white
racial domination with respect to Native Americans).
237 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 65 (1985) ("The
idea of property embraces the absolute right to exclude.").
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The legal systems of some communities reinforce the right to exclude as a possessory
right by reducing penalties for honor crimes.238 In so doing, the law suggests that the holder
of honor property may assert the right to exclude others and demand compliance with that
assertion. When an offender fails to comply and meddles with honor property (through an
alleged sexual transgression), the law allows the property holder to take steps to reclaim
the property through violence directed at the offending female family member and the
community member who failed to respect the possessory claim.
Gender subordination undergirds the right to exclude others from meddling with or
diminishing the value of honor property. Even when other females in the family share
in the benefits of honor property and police each other's sexual behavior, the regulatory
approach to women's sexuality is deeply subordinating and relies on male dominance.
Whether carried out by women or men, the regulation of women's sexuality in the name
of honor property severely undermines women's sexual autonomy and bodily integrity.
The law recognizes a possessory right to exclude others from interfering with one's use,
enjoyment, and control over honor property, thereby reifying women's lack of autonomy
in decisions related to sexual activity. Women do, of course, exercise agency in decisions
regarding their sexuality. When those decisions threaten the value of honor property,
however, women become vulnerable to violence.
B. Property as Communication
1. Property as Relational
Property is relational. There must be "some sort of social recognition of this relationship
[between property holder and the object of property]." 3 9 To be meaningful, the external
world, or community, must recognize the relationship between the property holder and the
object of property.
240
Male family members situate themselves in a particular relationship with the object
of honor property. Their relationship is one of control and exclusion; they seek to control
honor property and the status and benefits that flow from proper control. In other words,
if the male members of the family-in collaboration with female family members who
238 See supra notes 107-55.
239 See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 371, 380
(2003).
240 Id. ("In order for property to make its final appearance, individuals must consent to recognize and
respect each other's rights.").
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have a stake in the rewards of honor property-are able to control the sexuality of female
family members, they benefit in terms of social capital and economic reward.24" ' There are
significant incentives for them to place themselves "in the proper relationship with" honor
property.242
2. Communication of Possession
Property theorist Carol Rose observes the "social relationship of claim and
recognition only exists because people are able to communicate their claims and because
others understand and more or less agree to honor them. 2 43 Rose, in fact, suggests that
communication is the core of property theory.244 To establish oneself as the rightful possessor
of an item of property, one must communicate that claim to others. In determining what
counts as "possession," Rose observes that possession requires "a clear act, whereby all
the world understands" that a person intends to exert control over something.245 It is the
communication, or "clear act," and the receptivity within the community that leads to a
recognition and understanding of possession.
246
In the case of honor property, the community plays two significant communicative
roles in maintaining the concept of honor as property. First, the community recognizes
the relationship between the property holder and the honor property and expects family
members, particularly male family members, to zealously guard the family's honor
241 See AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY, supra note 166, at 18 (noting that, conversely, when women fail to adhere
to honor codes, the "livelihood of entire families may be affected: a shopkeeper who does not 'cleanse his
family honour' may lose all his customers, for example").
242 See Mossoff, supra note 239, at 381 ("For the essential characteristic of private property is the fact that
it belongs to a given individual in such a way as to be incapable of belonging to another individual.") (quoting
Hu(co GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES (lI)(2)(ii)(I), 228 (William Whewell trans., 1853)).
243 Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter Rose, Introduction] (describing language as the origin of property in the
common law system).
244 Id.
245 Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 76. Rose further clarifies this position by providing that "[t]he first to
say, 'This is mine,' in a way that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against
someone else who says, 'No, it is mine."' Id. at 81.
246 Id. at 78 ("Possession now begins to look even more like something that requires a kind of communication,
and the original claim to the property looks like a kind of speech, with the audience composed of all others who
might be interested in claiming the object in question.").
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property. 47 Second, the community also plays a role in assigning and regulating the value of
honor property. I call the community's first role its "receptive" role in honor property. In the
relational sense of property, the community receives information about the family's honor
property based on how vociferously the ownership of honor property is communicated
to the community, or, in other words, how aggressive the family is in openly policing
women's behavior. 48
As recipients of this communication, the community thus reinforces the notion that
family members must police women's behavior in an effort to protect against devaluation
of the family's honor property. By social mandate, the community requires that family
members police women's behavior.249 Laura Heymann notes that reputation is created by the
collective judgments of a community.25 0 Reputation itself is a thing of value that is created
not by its owner, but by the community at large through "intergroup communication.
125 '
When an individual's reputation is injured, the resulting harm is primarily due to the effect
247 See AMNESTY INT'L, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 186, at 12 ("The man who kills for reasons of honour
becomes ghairatnmand [possessing honour] and is morally and legally supported by his kinsmen. A man's ability to
protect his honour is judged by his family and neighbours and he is taunted by tano [insinuation bordering on insult]
that he is 'socially impotent' and beghairat [without honour] if he fails to kill a woman of his household who has
damaged his honour. Honour killings consequently are not hidden away but openly performed, often ritually and with
the maximum spilling of blood.") (emphasis in original). Communal recognition of the honor property is in line with
Carol Rose's requirement that there be an audience for the communication and that that audience understands the
language and message. See Rose, Introduction, supra note 243, at 6 ("A manifestation to inform the world means that
there is in fact an audience out there, and the audience has to 'get it."').
248 See GHANIM, supra note 172, at 40 ("Honor killing is strongly related to the protection of honor in patriarchal
societies. Perpetrators of these crimes are loaded with the pressures of a male-centered culture. The honor of men and
the community is mostly, if not solely, linked to the restriction of female relatives' sexuality, thereby establishing a
cult of virginity within the lives of Middle Eastern families."). Further, female family members are often complicit
in the policing of honor code violations. Id. at 45. "From the perspective of women who perpetrate or contribute to
honor killings, they have been forced into obedience and oppression their entire lives; why, then, would they choose
to take a different course of action, by allowing some women to behave differently?" Id.
249 MANSUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 13 (2009) ("Sections of society not only accept the crime as an honorable deed,
but more worryingly, they pressure, shun, ostracize and force families within their fold to murder their daughters,
sisters, mothers and female cousins.").
250 See Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1342
("[A]t its core, reputation is the result of a collective act ofjudging another.").
251 See id. Professor Heymann describes "intergroup communication" as what happens when members of a
community share opinions with one another about an individual or firm's reputation. Id. For example, it is not enough
for a single individual to visit a restaurant three times, have a bad meal each time, and then single-handedly determine
that the restaurant has a bad reputation. Id. Instead, "an inquiry about the reputation of another is seeking a collective
judgment formed via communications among a relevant community." Id. at 1351. "Communicating one's opinion
about another is thus necessary to the formation of reputation and to the acquisition of its benefits by both the holder
of reputation [and] by the relevant community." Id.
23.2 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW 245
it has on a community's perception of that individual, which in turn produces additional
injuries such as emotional harm or economic loss. 252 Thus, the community plays an important
role in determining the value of an individual's reputation.253 Because masculine identity
and self-worth is often tied to one's ability to protect the value of honor property,2 4 men
must effectively control honor property and communicate that control to the community in
order to derive value from it.
Rose refers to the "texts" of property as "signals ... that announce one's claims and
that are generally accepted as establishing or maintaining property rights. '255 The policing
actions of family members, such as ensuring that daughters or sisters are always accompanied
by a male family member, are the texts that communicate to others the high value of that
family's honor property. Other examples include forcing women to dress "modestly,"
arranging marriages through force or coercion, 256 and requiring women to undergo virginity
examinations.2 7 The public nature of many incidents of honor-related violence plays a
communicative role. The United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and
arbitrary executions reported, for example, that "[i]n Egypt, a father paraded his daughter's
252 Id. at 1342 (explaining that "[a]lthough an individual may suffer emotional harm and a corporation may lose
profits as a result of a reputational injury, these harms are derivative" of the change in the collective judgments of that
individual or firm resulting from the injury).
253 See id. (recognizing that although one "may have control over many of the statements, acts, and other data
points that form the basis of reputation," the end result, the assessment of those data points, is solely the province of
others).
254 See GHANIM, supra note 172, at 43 ("A man's masculinity is socially constructed through his ability to deny
other men sexual access to his female relatives."); Vandello, supra note 5, at 998 ("A man who allows his partner to
stray may be seen as less of a man. He may be perceived as weak and vulnerable, someone who can be taken advantage
of in other situations as well."). A woman's adultery (real or perceived) "represents not only an infringement of [a
male family member's] rights but the demonstration of failure of his duty. He has betrayed the values of his family,
bringing dishonor to all the social groups who are involved reciprocally in his honor: his family and his community."
Id. (quoting Pitt-Rivers, supra note 46, at 46).
255 Rose, Introduction, supra note 243, at 12 ("[N]o text means no property-no claims can be made and none
understood.").
256 See Ertiirk, supra note 145 ("For women, compliance with the code of honour can range from having to dress
and act with 'modesty,' to observing chastity prior to marriage, to accepting arranged marriages and not leaving the
house without the consent and/or accompaniment of an older relative.").
257 See GHANIM, supra note 172, at 43 ("Women are frequently taken to the hospital for a virginity test by parents
who suspect that the woman has lost her virginity, or by husbands who, on the wedding night, suspect that their new
wife is not a virgin. Although the doctors must ask for the woman's consent before performing the exam, women
have little choice but to consent given the circumstances and the social pressure to obey their husband and parents."
(quoting OMCT (WORLD ORGANIZATION AGAINST TORTURE), VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN TURKEY (2003), http://
uudenmaanpiiri.mll.fi/@Bin/126557/vawTurkey.pdf).
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severed head through the streets shouting, 'I avenged my honour.' 258 This tragic, public
act communicated to the community that the father was retaking lost honor property and
served as a warning to other women who might transgress social and sexual mores.
In many ways, these property-policing texts are similar to those employed by other
groups signaling their exclusive rights to a particular form of property. Rose offers several
examples. In support of the proposition that "violent or symbolically violent messages... are
a particularly crude form of group property texts," Rose mentions the phenomenon of
"localism" among surfers, in which they police the waters by excluding outsiders, "signaling
exclusive claims through dirty looks, rude comments, and jostling ,. ."I" Rose also cites
the example of the lobstermen of Monhegan Island in Maine, who police each other and
exclude non-local lobstermen through a range of "property-claiming texts. ' 260 Lastly, Rose
offers an example through her own research on racially restrictive covenants. Rose notes
that although the covenants were popular and legal at the time, the "most sharply segregated
white neighborhoods did not have them.126 1 Instead of covenants, those communities relied
on violence and threatening "texts" that were intended to signal exclusive ownership based
on race.262 In the context of honor, family members communicate possession as "text"
through their efforts to control women's sexual behavior and assertions of authority more
generally.
Second, the community plays a role in assigning and regulating the value of honor
property.263 I call this the community's "expressive" role in honor property. In this sense,
the community is making a statement to the family regarding the family's effort to
control honor property. To speak of the community as having one voice is, of course,
258 U.N. POPULATION FUND, THE STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION 2000, http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2000/
english/ch03.html (citing Jahangir 2000 report to the Commission on Human Rights).
259 Rose, Introduction, supra note 243, at 13 (citing Daniel Nazer, The Tragicomedy of the Surfers'
Commons, 9 DEAKIN L. REv. 655 (2004).
260 Id. at 14. Though Maine law forbids excluding "outsider fishers," Monhegan fishers disregard this
prohibition by using crude, but apparently effective, property texts: they mark "coarse sexual symbols on
outsiders' traps, or in more serious instances, cut[] the buoys from the outsiders' traps to make the traps
impossible to locate." Id. (citing JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49, 75 (1988)).
261 Id.
262 Id. (finding that violent and threatening behavior, such as racist signs painted on the walls of minority-
owned homes or bricks thrown through the windows, "sent a message of ownership: that the neighborhood
belonged to the white residents, to the exclusion of all others").
263 Rose notes that property cannot exist without the community's recognition of the validity of an
individual's claim, that the community "understand[s] and more or less agree[s] to honor [the claim]." See id.
at 3.
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inaccurate. As with any expressive system, some voices carry more weight than others,
and those voices tend to be considered definitive. 264 Because the community shuns
or embraces a family depending on the behavior of females in the family, it ascribes
variable value to the honor property.265 The community may express this valuation
in many ways, ranging from public ridicule to refusing to engage in commerce with
the "tarnished" family.266 Because honor property is inalienable, the market cannot
determine the value of honor property through traditional market-based transactions.
267
The community, however, plays an integral role in valuing or devaluing honor property.
The law reflects and reinforces the community's understanding of honor property
through its treatment of honor crimes. Efforts to reclaim honor property are treated as
mitigating circumstances, and perpetrators often receive reduced penalties for violence
that is understood or "read" as an effort to reclaim honor property.268 The law thus lends
credibility to the symbolic system of texts that construct honor property.
2 69
As with most property systems, clear articulations of ownership or possession avoid
ambiguity and therefore reduce conflict. 27° Owners of honor property clearly communicate
their ownership to the world and thus avoid the necessity of fighting off those would-be
suitors who could significantly reduce the value of honor property. They invest their labor (in
the Lockean sense) in policing women's sexual behavior and thereby continually articulate
their claims to honor property in ways that are unambiguous and widely recognized. 7'
For men, clear articulations regarding the possession of honor property operate to curtail
264 Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 85 (noting that not all audiences will use or understand a particular
"expressive" system and that "audiences that do not understand or accept the symbols are out of luck").
265 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
266 See AMNESTY INT'L, TURKEY, supra note 166, at 18 (explaining that when women fail to adhere to honor
codes, the "livelihood of entire families may be affected: a shopkeeper who does not 'cleanse his family
honour' may lose all his customers, for example").
267 See Rose, Introduction, supra note 243, at 20 (noting that the market typically determines the value of
property).
268 KARO KARl, supra note 189, at 39.
269 Rose, Posession, supra note 36, at 85 ("[I]n defining the acts of possession that make up a claim to
property, the law not only rewards the author of the 'text'; it also puts an imprimatur on a particular symbolic
system and on the audience that uses that system.").
270 Id. at 81-82 ("Why, then, is it so important that property owners make and keep their communications
clear? Economists have an answer: clear titles facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict.").
271 Id. at 81 ("If I am careless about who comes on to a comer of my property, I invite others to make
mistakes and to waste their labor on improvements to what I have allowed them to think is theirs.").
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violence.272 Women, on the other hand, often experience the "textual" assertion of honor
property in ways that increase rather than curtail violence. Women are forced to adhere to
strictly circumscribed gender roles, knowing that the consequences of straying outside the
bounds of "proper" behavior range from bullying to murder.273
III. Implications of the Property Perspective
There are several possible responses to the problem of treating honor as a form of
property that is held largely by male family members. The first is to simply disavow honor
as an organizing principle. Given that honor is a deeply entrenched social value within
many communities, this reform strategy is misguided and unlikely to succeed. Moreover,
honor as reputational property is not inherently problematic. It becomes a problem when
its value is linked to the chastity or behavior of female family members, and it is possessed
and controlled largely by men in the natal family.
The second possible response is to relocate the ownership of honor property in the
women who are themselves the source of honor property. Although in some instances
women already generate honor through conduct that is culturally valued and completely
unrelated to sexuality, 74 many women experience honor primarily as a regulatory device.
This approach argues that women should directly and primarily experience the benefits
and harms that flow, respectively, from conformity and nonconformity to social and sexual
expectations. Refocusing honor property on women as potential beneficiaries would treat
women as potential honor property holders and vest in them the right to make decisions
about their sexuality. Recognizing women's right to make autonomous decisions about sex
and marriage would delegitimize male assertions of control over the sexuality of their sisters,
272 Jane Schneider, Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame, and Access to Resources in Mediterranean
Societies, 10 ETHNOLOGY 1, 17 (1971) ("Honor is ... important as a substitute for physical violence in the
defense of economic interests. The head of a family challenges the rest of the world with the idea of his family's
honor.").
273 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HONORING THE KILLERS, supra note 17, at I ("In Jordan, a woman's life is
at risk if she engages in 'immoral or shameful' acts .... Male relatives may beat, shoot, stab, or otherwise
physically harm an accused woman, with the approval of both her family members and large sections of the
general population."); Cohan, supra note 14, at 187 ("[W]hen honor is supposedly betrayed or lost, disciplining,
or even killing, the woman at fault may restore honor that has been damaged by a woman's immoral or unchaste
actions.").
274 Examples include women who have garnered respect and honor as a result of achievements in their
personal or professional lives as well as women who enjoy respect and honor by birthright such as female
traditional leaders (or Queenmothers) in Ghana. See Marijke Steegstra, Krobo Queen Mothers: Gender Power
and Contemporary Female Traditional Authority in Ghana, 55 AFRICA TODAY 105, 106 (2009).
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daughters, and wives. Without delinking the concepts of honor and women's sexuality,
however, shifting the ownership of honor property to women themselves preserves the
oppressive, gender-based regulation of female sexuality.
Under this second possible response, which maintains an intact and unchallenged
relationship between honor and women's sexuality, women would continue to face
ostracism, discrimination, and potentially violence if they expressed their sexuality in a way
that transgressed social mores. Even if a conceptual shift were successful in recognizing
women as the legitimate holders of honor property, women's decisions concerning sexuality
would continue to be severely constrained by the threatened loss of honor property. In other
words, women would themselves continue to suffer potentially severe social consequences
if they themselves experienced a loss of honor.
It is true, however, that lawmakers would no longer be able to justify reduced penalties
for those who commit honor crimes, because women's alleged sexual transgressions would
not cause a loss of value in the natal family's collective honor property. Rather, the accused
woman herself would suffer a loss of esteem not shared as acutely by the other members of
her family. Male family members would no longer be able to justify honor-related violence
as a way of reclaiming collective family honor. Preserving honor and recognizing women
as the holders of honor property would provide a basis for discrediting legal provisions that
offer reduced penalties for perpetrators of honor crimes, but it would do little to dismantle
the oppressive social and sexual codes that require women's strict adherence.
A third, and preferable, response would be to recognize women's rights both to possess
honor property and to dismantle the rigid system of reward/punishment surrounding
women's sexuality. Although this would not be easily accomplished because of the
entrenched nature of honor within the value systems of many communities, this strategy
offers women greater long-term hope for the enjoyment of a range of human rights,
including rights related to dignity, bodily integrity, and sexual autonomy.
Within many communities, honor is a foundational, constitutive value that is unlikely
to recede in the public consciousness any time soon. The challenge, therefore, involves
redefining honor without reference to women's sexuality. Recognizing the saliency of
honor, human rights activists in a number of countries have begun to appropriate and
redefine the concept of honor.75 The core message of these campaigns seeks to define
275 See Welchman & Hossain, supra note 4, at 6-7 ("[I]n Pakistan, activists have named the killers of
women as dishonourable, in an attempt to destabilise the prevailing understanding of'honour'.... Recovering
or reclaiming the notion of 'honour' would reformulate it as attaching to women as well as to men, designating
qualities of respect, tolerance and inclusivity.").
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honor crimes themselves as dishonorable.276
If this discursive shift is successful over time, honor will continue to be a socially
valued asset. The accumulation and retention of honor, however, will not depend on the
extent to which women's behavior conforms to social norms. Perhaps honor or shame will
stem from the treatment of children, neighbors, or business affiliates. The redefinition of
honor will be highly contextual and dependent on the interpretations and normative agendas
of local communities. The human rights framework offers a vocabulary and a range of core
concepts that local advocates can tailor to specific audiences and social justice strategies.
A human rights approach is a useful tool in re-framing the issues surrounding women's
sexuality.
By recognizing the ways in which legal systems have implicitly treated honor as a
form of property, it may be possible to institute reforms that both respond to and refine
the conception of honor as property. For example, criminal law reform that responds to
the cost-benefit calculations of families who commit honor crimes by increasing the costs
associated with honor-related violence may benefit women living in those communities.
A punitive, criminal justice response serves a limited function. In some cases, increasing
the costs of honor-related violence may have a welcome deterrent effect. Experiences within
the domestic violence community in some countries suggest that increasing the punitive
consequences of violence within the family may be counterproductive, particularly within
communities that are already marginalized by the legal system.277 There is expressive
value, however, in prohibiting and punishing violent conduct. Increasing the costs of
honor-related violence thus challenges the prevailing understanding of honor as a male
form of property by discrediting the notion that male family members may act with relative
impunity for reclaiming honor property through violence. In addition to legal reform, a
successful campaign to combat honor crimes must also include wide-scale community
discourse designed to redefine honor in ways that disassociate it from women's sexuality
and recognize women as potential honor property holders.
276 Id.
277 See Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and
Gender: Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Maginalized Women in Diverse
Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 55 (2005) (noting that the unintended consequences of an
overreliance on law enforcement can "create tensions for poor women of color between the need for some kind
of state intervention to protect them from abuse in their homes and the recognition that many of the women
most in need of such protection are made more vulnerable by these very interventions").
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A. Regulation and Rationality
Generally, laws are designed to regulate behavior by manipulating incentives. 278 For
example, in the criminal context, deterrence works if the government makes it costly (in
terms of personal, professional, or economic cost) to commit a crime. 279 The model of
deterrence, however, assumes a rational actor who is able to evaluate and act upon the
evaluation of the costs of crime and punishment.
20
Honor crimes-for the most part-involve just such a rational actor. As has been
shown above, honor crimes are often committed by a member of the family after some
degree of planning.28' The violence is often a concerted effort by the family to regain
its honor.282 Unlike heat of passion murders, which may also implicate notions of honor
and masculinity, they are rarely committed as a result of genuine, sudden provocation.283
Because honor-related violence is generally premeditated, honor crimes should-at least
theoretically-be responsive to appropriate criminal legislation. This, of course, assumes
the existence of a state that is willing to enforce the law and prosecute perpetrators of
honor-related violence.
278 Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 54, 68 (2006) ("Laws attempt to modify incentives and payoffs in order to reduce the actual (objective)
likelihood of harmful behavior (risks).").
279 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971) ("The theory of simple deterrence is that
threats can reduce crime by causing a change of heart in would-be offenders, induced by the unpleasant prospect
of the specific consequences threatened. Many individuals who are tempted by a particular form of threatened
behavior will, according to this construct, refrain from committing the offense because the pleasure they might
obtain is more than offset by the risk of great unpleasantness communicated by a legal threat.").
280 MANSUR ET AL., supra note 6, at 30-31 ("The subject of using economic tools in the analysis of crime
was first legitimized by the groundbreaking research of Gary Becker, which, based on rational choice theory,
subsumes that perpetrator of a crime is a rational person who weighs prior to committing the crime, the cost and
benefits from committing the crime. Since then, a number of studies using several data collection approaches
have supported the central proposition of rational choice theory, that offenders weigh the costs and benefits of
crime in deciding whether to offend.").
281 Erturk, supra note 145 ("What distinguishes honour-related killings from other forms of violence against
women is the way they are organized and executed. A family council, which may also include members of the
extended kin, decides upon and organizes the murder.").
282 Id.
283 Warrick, supra note 18, at 327 ("In most cases [honor crimes] are premeditated, and they are typically
extremely violent .... ").
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One way to change the rational evaluation of risk surrounding honor-related violence
is to increase penalties. Eliminating the penalty discount for honor-related crimes would
be a good place to start. States should consider going further with criminal law reform
and increasing penalties for honor-related violence. Rather than being neutral on honor,
the criminal law could create a penalty enhancement for honor-related violence. Serious
criminal penalties send a message that there is honor in preserving-rather than taking-
women's lives, which is a normative message that should be embraced by states.
Violence perpetrated for -economic gain is often seen as more nefarious than other
forms of violence. Many states in the United States' legal system, for example, treat
economic gain as an aggravating motive in sentencing violent crimes. 84 The law creates a
penalty enhancement for economically motivated violence. If one accepts the premise that
honor-related violence is an effort to reclaim honor property, then it certainly falls within
the category of violence that is motivated by economic or property concerns. Because it
falls within this category of "violence plus," and, most importantly, because it severely
undermines women's rights to be free from violence, states should consider a penalty
enhancement for honor-related violence. Whether or not enhanced penalties will actually
curb honor-related violence-and some feminists credibly critique this notion-the law's
prohibition of the violence serves important expressive goals. There is value in public
condemnation of gender-based violence.
Although a detailed description of international advocacy related to honor crimes
is outside the scope of this Article, it is useful to point out that many of the relevant
international human rights documents urge states to amend criminal laws that allow for
lenient penalties for honor-related violence. The international discourse surrounding honor
crimes has encouraged states to critically examine the ways in which their legal systems
have supported honor-related violence. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women has often raised the issue in its examination
of States Parties' reports.2 85 And the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
284 Carissa Hessick, Motives Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 103 ("Pecuniary gain
may be the most prevalent aggravating motive. Many state capital sentencing schemes classify pecuniary gain
as an aggravating sentencing factor.").
285 See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Pakistan, 38th Sess., May 14, 2007-June I,
2007, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/3 (June 11, 2007) ("The Committee calls on the State party to ensure that
the Qisas and Diyat law has no application in cases of violence against women, especially crimes committed
in the name of honour ... ").
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encouraging states to take steps to aggressively combat the practice.286
The global campaign to end violence against women has made significant strides
in the last two decades. 287 One major accomplishment has been the expansion of state
responsibility to include human rights accountability for states that fail to use due diligence
to combat violence against women. 288 Under this standard, states that fail to prosecute
or adequately punish perpetrators of honor-related violence will be responsible under
international human rights law for the failure to act. 289 Under relevant international human
rights law, reformers would find support for eliminating penalty reductions for honor-
related violence.
In addition, states that cede too much authority to local communities to police
themselves may be responsible under international human rights law for failing to act
to prevent violence against women. 290 Shakti Vahini, a non-governmental organization
in India, conducted research to determine whether the presence of a strong and active
panchayat, or local community council, had an effect on the rate of honor killings in a
particular area.2 1' The research revealed a correlation between an active panchayat and
286 Working Towards the Elimination of Crimes Against Women Committed in the Name of Honour, G.A.
Res. 57/179, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/179 (Jan. 30, 2003) ("Bearing in mind that crimes against women committed
in the name of honour are a human rights issue and that States have an obligation to exercise due diligence
to prevent, investigate and punish the perpetrators of such crimes and to provide protection to the victims,
and that not doing so violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental
freedoms....").
287 Johanna Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's
International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMoRy L.J. 71, 77 (2003) (describing progress made in combating
violence against women globally).
288 G.A. Res. 57/179, supra note 286.
289 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (requiring states to "[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in
accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated
by the State or by private persons").
290 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the
Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/83/
Add. 1, at 31 (Feb. 27, 2003) ("By arguing that custom, tradition and religion cannot be invoked by State parties
to defend violence against women in the family, international standards reject the cultural relativist argument
that cultural practices that are violent towards women in the family should be shielded from international
scrutiny.").
291 Roy, supra note 105 ("In districts where councils play an active role, there have been more honor
killings than in districts where the councils are dormant or absent.").
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increased incidents of honor-related violence. 292 In an unprecedented ruling, one local
court responded by finding members of the local panchayat responsible for incitement to
murder.293 Shakti Vahini's research suggests that, in this particular location in India where
the state has ceded greater control to local councils, honor-related violence thrives.2 94 As a
result, activists within Shakti Vahini may urge intervention at the national level to ensure
that strategies to combat honor crimes are coordinated and successful.
International pressure can be a useful catalyst for national and subnational discussions
concerning honor-related violence. If not coupled with culturally sensitive community-
level human rights programs, however, international discourse may be seen as an attack
on cultural identity and serve to entrench support for honor-related violence. For any
legislative reform to be effective, it must be accompanied by an attitudinal shift at the
community and state level. Without a genuine discursive shift, legislation will accomplish
little in terms of lasting social change. The challenge, therefore, is to supplement law reform
with meaningful community-based dialogue that is designed to challenge the normative
construction of honor as a male property right.
B. Regulation as Social Text
Because reputation derives its force from the socially constructed meaning attached
to it,295 honor is susceptible to social re-construction. The challenge, then, is to shift the
normative meaning surrounding honor so that its gain or loss no longer threatens the very
identity and well-being of families.
Changing public sentiment concerning honor and honor-related violence will require
rights activists to be actively engaged in community-level discourse. Kwame Anthony
Appiah argues that honor crimes will not disappear until it becomes dishonorable to
commit them.2 96 Exploring the eradication of foot binding in China, Appiah argues that
concern about China's global reputation was a significant motivating force in the eventual
292 Id.
293 Id. ("In rural Haryana, people mention not the Manoj-Babli murders, but simply 'Manoj-Babli'-
referring to the killing of a young couple by members of the girl's family and to a local court ruling that became
the first in modem Indian history to find council members guilty of incitement to murder.").
294 Id. ("Ravi Kant, a lawyer and founder of Shakti Vahini, said the organization's research found a
relationship between the local power of the community councils and a rise in [honor] killings.").
295 See Heymann, supra note 250, at 1358.
296 APPIAH, supra note 180, at 172 ("Honor will only perish when it is seen as dishonorable.").
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demise of the tradition. 297 Kang Youweri, a member of the ruling Chinese class, wrote to
the Imperial Palace in Beijing in 1898, arguing that foot binding had damaged China's
international reputation and calling for its prohibition.2 98 The argument concerning China's
international reputation eventually took hold and the practice ended in the early 1900s in
what Appiah describes as a "moral revolution. '299
To dismantle the notion of honor as a "legitimate" justification for gender-based
violence is to modify the content of the communications surrounding honor property. As
Rose argues, communication is a necessary part of possession.3"' For the community to
recognize and respect a possessory claim, the property holder mustarticulate the claim in
a way that the community understands.3°0 Community members share an understanding
of the property "text."30 2 In the case of honor crimes, the "text" signals control over
women's sexuality. For example, ensuring that a female in the family never leaves the
home unescorted by a male relative is an intelligible communication about the level of
control that the family asserts over its female members, from which the family derives
honor property.
Law is also a communicative text. Penal provisions that discount punishment for
honor-related violence reflect and reinforce the notion that male holders of honor property
are justified in their actions to reclaim damaged honor property. As noted above, social
science indicates that the incidence of honor-related violence is greater when there is
297 Id. at 60 (explaining that footbinding in China ended because "concern for national honor was shared by
many in the educated classes who shaped China's transformation from an empire into a modem state").
298 Id. (Kang states, "Foreigners have been taking pictures and laughing at us for these things and criticizing
us for being barbarians. There is nothing which makes us objects of ridicule so much as footbinding. I, your
humble servant, feel deeply ashamed at heart.").
299 In one rural province, rates of foot binding went from ninety-four percent in 1899 to zero in 1919. Id. at
98 (citing Gerry Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 99 1,
1001 (1996)).
300 See Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 81 ("Possession as the basis of ownership, then, seems to amount
to something like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to say 'That is mine,' in a way
that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone else who says,
'No, it is mine."') (emphasis in original).
301 Rose, Introduction, supra note 243, at 6.
302 Id. ("A manifestation to inform the world means that there is in fact an audience out there, and the
audience has to 'get it."'); Rose, Possession, supra note 36, at 84-85 ("It is not enough, then, for the property
claimant to say simply, 'It's mine' through so me act or gesture; in order for the 'statement' to have any force,
some relevant world must understand the claim it makes and take that claim seriously.").
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less law or where the influence of criminal penalties is weak. 303 Criminal law reform that
eliminates the penalty discount then serves as an important communicative text. The text
challenges the notion that men are the proper possessors of honor property. In so doing,
the law implicitly recognizes women as the holders of honor property, which may lead to a
decrease in the violent policing of behavior by male members of the family.
State intervention in the form of criminal enforcement also serves as symbolic text.
Importantly, when the state eliminates penalty discounts for honor-related violence and
prosecutes perpetrators of such violence, it conveys a social disapproval that should, over
time, decrease incidence of the violence. Law alone will not combat honor-related violence,
however.
Delegitimizing honor property as a male property right will require active and
sustained discursive engagement with local communities. The goal of this community
discourse should be to change the normative meaning of the communications surrounding
the possession of honor property. Appiah's insight that honor crimes will not be eliminated
until it becomes dishonorable to commit them is instructive. Legal regulation of honor-
related violence is a crucial first step to reframing honor-related violence as dishonorable.
CONCLUSION
Around the world, honor operates as social capital. Property theory elucidates the many
ways that honor property resembles more traditional forms of property. Recognizing honor
as a form of "new property" provides a better understanding of the economic incentives
motivating honor-related violence and offers new insight concerning strategies to combat
this form of violence. This Article offers a new theoretical, property-based model through
which to explore the social meaning of honor. Because honor operates to constrain women's
sexuality in similar, although not identical, ways around the world, it is a generalized model
that may be fine-tuned for applicability in different geographic or socio-political areas.
Legal regulation of honor-related violence, specifically criminal law reform that
eliminates penalty discounts for crimes motivated by honor, is a critical mechanism to alter
the normative meaning of honor. This type of law reform becomes a social text signaling
disapproval of male efforts to reclaim honor property through violence. It also delegitimizes
the notion that honor property is owned by male family members and is thus subject to
reclamation through male violence. Legal regulation opens the door for relocating honor
property within the women who are themselves responsible for generating value in honor
property. To make honor property a potential asset for women, however, also requires
delinking honor from women's strict adherence to norms of chastity and virginity. Such a
redefinition of honor holds the potential for women to be full citizens with equal rights to
property, economic empowerment, bodily integrity, and sexual autonomy.
303 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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